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Professor Michael Greenberger*

Overwhelming a Financial Regulatory Black Hole
with Legislative Sunlight: Dodd-Frank’s Attack on
Systemic Economic Destabilization Caused by an
Unregulated Multi-Trillion Dollar Derivatives
Market
It is now accepted wisdom that it was the non-transparent, poorly

capitalized and almost wholly unregulated over-the-counter (“OTC”)
derivatives market that lit the fuse that exploded the highly vulnerable
worldwide economy in the fall of 2008.1 Because tens of trillions of dollars
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F:0 F;) !""%0" 9) M.9(: )* G7*.*(7.5 <0/)&+NM0 O006 .* !*6040*60*9 C)*"%+0& M.9(:6)8
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of these financial products were pegged to the economic performance of an
overheated and highly inflated housing market, the sudden collapse of that
market triggered under-capitalized OTC derivative guarantees of the
subprime housing market; and the guarantors’ multi-trillion dollar
interconnectedness with thousands of other OTC derivatives’ counterparties
within that OTC market (through interest rate, currency, foreign exchange,
and energy derivatives) required taxpayers to plug the huge capital holes
that cascading nonpayment would have caused, thereby leading the world’s
economy to crater.2
As it now stands, the world is still in the midst of the worst financial
crisis since the Great Depression of the 1930’s. This article explains the
history of derivatives products, including the highly charged political events
surrounding deregulation of these huge financial markets even in the face of
mounting evidence of the danger that those unregulated instruments could
cause the U.S. and world financial system.3 The article then provides an
overview of how recent Congressional OTC derivatives financial reform—
Title VII of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection
Act (“Dodd-Frank Act”)—will substantially mitigate those risks if properly
implemented by federal regulators, while at the same time allowing
financial markets to thrive through ensuring capital adequacy, transparency
and liquidity.4 The article ends with a vision for what the financial system
would look like if Dodd-Frank is implemented as its drafters intended.5
The History of Derivatives and Derivatives Market Regulation

F:0 '.&5, D0&7A.97A0" E.&>09. Beginning in 1865, farmers and grain
merchants coalesced in Chicago to hedge price risk in corn, wheat and other
grains in what are thought to be the earliest sustained derivatives

804575197852294753766 html; Henry T. C. Hu, P'+49, C&0679)&"ࣔ .*6 9:0 C&7"7", WALL ST.
J., Apr. 10, 2009, at A13.
2J -00 Moshinsky "%4&. note 1; Krugman "%4&. note 1; Blinder "%4&. note 1; Hu "%4&. note
1.
3J !*/&. p. 122–23.
4J !*/&. p. 144.
5J !*/&. p. 148.
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transactions in this country.6 These kinds of derivatives have been
historically referred to as futures contracts.7
Since their creation, derivatives markets were recognized as being
subject to price distortion (7J0J, rather than providing hedging, they can
cause payments of unnecessary and unexpected higher or lower spot prices)
through excessive speculation, fraud, or manipulation.8 As one disgruntled
farmer told the House Agriculture Committee in 1892: “[T]he man who
managed or sold or owned those immense wheat fields has not as much to
say with the regard to the price of the wheat than some young fellow who
stands howling around the Chicago wheat pit could actually sell in a day.”9
F:0 $&787*" .*6 3%&4)"0" )/ 9:0 C)++)679, 'Q(:.*80 2(9. Because
low farm prices wreaked financial havoc on America’s agriculture sector
during the Depression, President Roosevelt recommended to Congress, as
one of his earliest market reform proposals, legislation that became the
Commodity Exchange Act of 1936.10 When introducing this legislation in
1934, President Roosevelt said: “[I]t should be our national policy to
restrict, as far as possible, the use of these [futures] exchanges for purely
speculative operations.”11 Accordingly, the 1935 Report of House
Agriculture Committee stated:
F:0 /%*6.+0*9.5 4%&4)"0 )/ 9:0 +0."%&0 R7J0JS ;:.9 ;." 9)
H0()+0 9:0 C)++)679, 'Q(:.*80 2(9 )/ TUVWX 7" 9) 7*"%&0 /.7&
4&.(97(0 .*6 :)*0"9 60.57*8 )* 9:0 ()++)679, 0Q(:.*80" .*6 9)
4&)A760 . +0."%&0 )/ ()*9&)5 )A0& 9:)"0 /)&+" )/ "40(%5.97A0
.(97A79, ;:7(: 9)) )/90* 60+)&.57K0 9:0 +.&>09" 9) 9:0 7*Y%&, )/
4&)6%(0&" .*6 ()*"%+0&" .*6 9:0 0Q(:.*80" 9:0+"05A0"J12

6. Jonathan Ira Levy, C)*90+45.97*8 D057A0&,@ G%9%&0" F&.67*8 .*6 9:0 3&)H50+ )/
C)++)679, 'Q(:.*80 7* 9:0 Z*7906 -9.90", T[\]BTU^], AMERICAN HISTORICAL REVIEW 307,
307-09 (2006) .
7. NICK BATTLEY, AN INTRODUCTION TO COMMODITY FUTURES AND OPTIONS 17-18 (2nd
ed. 1995).
8J -00 Levy "%4&. note 6 at 310.
9J !6J at 307 (quoting House Committee on Agriculture, G7(9797)%" D0.57*8" 7* 28&7(%59%&.5
3&)6%(9"@ ?0.&7*8 H0/)&0 9:0 ?)%"0 C)++J )* 28&7(%59%&0 )* ?J<J VU_S _WUUS .*6 V[\^, 52nd
Cong., 3rd sess., (1892)).
10. Public Papers and Addresses of Franklin D. Roosevelt, 3 PUB. PAPERS 81 (1938). -00
.5"), 7 U.S.C. §§ 6–27 (2006).
11. Roosevelt, "%4&. note 10.
12. H.R. REP. NO. 421, at 1 (1935).
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Thus, the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”), as amended, required
that all futures contracts be traded on a regulated exchange providing full
transparency to trading behavior and to the formation of futures prices.13
The exchange trading requirement of the CEA was so central to that
statute’s policy that it is still a felony to knowingly violate it and substantial
fines may be levied upon offending dealers and their employees.14
F:0 O.9%&0 )/ G%9%&0" C)*9&.(9"J The most prominent treatise on
derivatives defines a “futures contract” as follows:
F:0 9&.6797)*.5 /%9%&0" ()*9.(9 7" .* .8&00+0*9 H09;00* . "0550&
.*6 . H%,0& 9:.9 9:0 "0550& `(.5506 . ":)&9a ;755 6057A0& 9) 9:0
H%,0& `(.5506 . 5)*8aS .9 . 4&7(0 .8&006 9) ;:0* 9:0 ()*9&.(9 7"
/7&"9 0*90&06S .*6 9:0 H%,0& ;755 .((049 .*6 4., /)&S . "40(7/706
I%.*979, .*6 8&.60 )/ .* 760*97/706 ()++)679, 7* 9:0 /%9%&0J15
While futures contracts were first developed for the agriculture sector,
they expanded into metals and energy products.16 “[T]here has been a
continual [further] expansion of the futures and derivatives market [to]
[f]inancial futures—on government securities, private debt issues, foreign
currencies and stock indexes—an increasingly important part of the
commodities world.”17
“Standardization of terms is a key feature of publicly traded futures
contracts. Under a futures contract, most customers do not expect to take
delivery. . . . There is an opportunity to offset, and the customer has a right
to liquidate rather than take [or make] delivery.”18 Only through the use of
highly standardized products can the necessary liquidity be developed that
allows traders the much needed ability to offset quickly delivery
commitments in order to avoid unwanted delivery obligations.19
One more recent accepted method of “avoiding delivery” is to “cash
settle” the futures transaction based on the market price of the futures
contract, a settlement process that has been deemed by the Commodity

13. 7 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2009).
14J !6J § 13(b).
15. PHILLIP MCBRIDE JOHNSON & THOMAS LEE HAZEN, DERIVATIVES REGULATION,
§1.02[3] at 25 (2004) (hereinafter DERIVATIVES REGULATION).
16J !6J
17J !6J § 1.02 [1] at 11.
18J !6J at 24–25 n. 97.
19J !6J
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Futures Trading Commission (“CFTC”) to be wholly permissible under the
CEA.20
F:0 C)*9)%&" )/ 9:0 'Q(:.*80 F&.67*8 <0I%7&0+0*9. As would be
expected of a market regulation bill that followed in the wake of the
Securities Acts of 1933 and 1934, the contours of futures exchange
regulation closely mirrored the regulation of the equities markets, 7J0J,
futures contracts were required to be traded on publicly transparent and
fully regulated exchanges supported by clearing mechanisms that ensured
that contractual commitments would be backed by adequate capital.21
Under the CEA specifically, regulated exchanges ensured that futures
contracts were subject to: (1) public and transparent pricing based on
market demand; (2) disclosure of the real trading parties in interest to the
federal government; (3) regulation of intermediaries; 7J0., brokers and their
employers; (4) stringent rules for customer protection; (5) self regulation by
exchanges directly supervised by a federal regulator to detect unlawful
trading activity; (6) prohibitions against fraud, market manipulation and
excessive speculation; and (7) enforcement of all these requirements by
federal regulators, private individuals and the states, the latter two through
private rights of action and state 4.&0*" 4.9&7.0 suits, respectively.22
As an integral part of this regulatory format, futures contracts also had
to be cleared, 7J0., a well capitalized and regulated intermediary institution
was required to stand between the counterparties of a futures contract to
ensure that commitments undertaken pursuant to those contracts were
adequately capitalized through the collection of margin.23 Any contractual
failure was guaranteed by the clearing facility, a financial commitment that
served to ensure that the clearing facility had a strong incentive to enforce
strictly the capital adequacy of traders, through highly disciplined
assessments of the market prices of futures positions, as well as immediate
collection of two types of margin: (1) initial margin upon executing a
futures trade and (2) variation margin as the contract price moves against a
counterparty to the trade.24
F:0 D0A05)4+0*9 .*6 C:.&.(90&7"97(" )/ -;.4". By the 1980’s, a
variant of futures contracts was developed, commonly referred to as

20J
21J
22.
23J
24J

!6J § 1.03[8] at 146–47.
-00 76J
7 U.S.C. § 6 (2006).
-00 76J at § 1.18.
-00 76J
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“swaps.”25 When first addressing swaps contracts, the CFTC defined them
as “an agreement between two parties to exchange a series of cash flows
measured by different interest rates, exchanges rates, or prices with
payment calculated by reference to a principal base (notional amount).”26
Similarly, the International Swaps Derivatives Association (“ISDA”)
defines a swap as “[a] derivative where two counterparties exchange
streams of cash flows with each other.27 These streams of cash flows are
known as the ‘legs’ of the swap and are calculated by reference to a
notional amount.”28
A classic example of an interest rate swap transaction is where one
party to the agreement exchanges a floating interest rate obligation on an
existing loan for a fixed rate obligation to be paid by a swaps dealer or by
another counterparty to which the swap has been assigned by the swaps
dealer.29 Usually, the person swapping the floating rate for a fixed rate is
expecting (or hedging against the fact) that the fixed rate will be lower than
the floating rate.30
In other words, the underlying loan is usually neither negotiated nor
renegotiated under the swap.31 It is an assumed amount written into the
swap, most often reflecting an actual outstanding loan of one of the swaps
customers from a creditor or lender upon which a floating rate is being paid
to the lender.32 The fixed interest rate payments paid by the swaps dealer to
the borrower would also be specified in the transaction, as would the
manner in which the floating rate would be calculated.33 Thus, rather than
buying/selling a "7*850 future rate or price (as would be true in a traditional
futures contract), there is a “swapping” of commitments, with one party
buying the fixed rate and selling the floating rate, while the other party is
buying the floating rate and selling the fixed rate.34

25J -00 DERIVATIVES REGULATION § 102[12A] at 29–30 (Supp. 2010).
26. Statement of Policy Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30694 (July 21, 1989).
27J -00 INT’L SWAP DEALERS ASS’N, INC., ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (1992), .A.75.H50 .9
www.isb.uzh.ch/studium/courses06/pdf/0344_1992_ISDA_MA.pdf.
28. DCG Glossary, International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc. website, .A.75.H50
.9 http://www.isda.org/c_and_a/oper_commit-dcg-glossary htmlJ
29. BATTLEY "%4&. note 7 at 5–12; "00 .5") SATYAJIT DAS, TRADERS, GUNS AND MONEY:
KNOWNS AND UNKNOWNS IN THE DAZZLING WORLD OF DERIVATIVES (rev. ed. 2010).
30. BATTLEY, "%4&. note 7 at 5–12.
31J !6J
32J !6J
33J !6J
34J !6J
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-;.4" .*6 9:0 C'2b" 'Q(:.*80 F&.67*8 <0I%7&0+0*9. After swaps
contracts had been developed by the banks/dealers in the 1980s, with a
simultaneous recognition that swaps contained all the features of a futures
contract, the question arose whether swaps would be subject to the
mandatory exchange trading requirement of the CEA.35 In a 1989 Policy
Statement, the CFTC set forth the criteria for the kind of swaps for “which
regulation under the CEA and Commission regulations [of swaps would be]
unnecessary.”36 The CFTC recognized that swaps at that time required
R9X.75)&7*8 J J J 9:&)%8: 4&7A.90 *08)97.97)*" H09;00* 9:0 4.&970"
.*6 +., 7*A)5A0 *)9 )*5, /7*.*(7.5 90&+" H%9 7""%0" "%(: ."
&04&0"0*9.97)*"S ()A0*.*9"S 0A0*9" )/ 60/.%59S 90&+ 9) +.9%&79,
.*6 .*, &0I%7&0+0*9 /)& 9:0 4)"97*8 )/ ()55.90&.5 )& )9:0& (&0679
0*:.*(0+0*9J -%(: 9.75)&7*8 .*6 ()%*90&4.&9, (&0679 .""0""+0*9"
67"97*8%7": ";.4 9&.*".(97)*" /&)+ 0Q(:.*80 9&.*".(97)*"S ;:0&0
9:0 ()*9&.(9 90&+" .&0 "9.*6.&67K06 .*6 9:0 ()%*90&4.&9, 7"
%*>*);*J37
Accordingly, the CFTC exempted swaps from the CEA exchange
trading requirement by stating that “swaps must be negotiated by the parties
as to their material terms, based upon individualized credit determinations,
and documented by the parties in an agreement or series of agreements that
is not fully standardized.”38 Another condition of the exchange trading
exemption is that “[t]he swap must not be marketed to the public.”39
Because the CEA provided no explicit provision authorizing the CFTC
to grant an exemption from the CEA’s exchange trading requirement such
as that found in the CFTC’s 1989 Policy Statement, swaps dealers/banks
contended that there was “uncertainty” as to the legal effect of that policy
statement.40 Thus, Congress in 1992 passed the Futures Trading Practices
Act (“FTPA”), adding a new § 4(c)(5)(b) to the CEA which authorized the
precise criteria for the CFTC to create exemptions from the CEA’s
35. Statement of Policy Concerning Swap Transactions, 54 Fed. Reg. 30694 (July 21, 1989).
36J !6J
37J !6J (emphasis added).
38J !6J
39. DERIVATIVES REGULATION, "%4&. note 15, at 43.
40. The <)50 )/ D0&7A.97A0" 7* 9:0 G7*.*(7.5 C&7"7"@ ?0.&7*8 H0/)&0 9:0 G7*.*(7.5 C&7"7"
!*I%7&,
C)++7""7)*,
111th
Cong.
(June
30,
2010),
available
at
http://www fcic.gov/hearings/pdfs/2010-0630-Greenberger.pdf (prepared testimony of Michael
Greenberger, Law School Prof., Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law).
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mandatory exchange trading requirement for, 7*90& .57., “swap agreements”
that “are not part of a fungible class of agreements that are standardized as
to their material economic terms. . . .”41
The Commission later explained this statutory bar to standardization of
swaps transactions as follows:
F:7" ()*6797)* R9:.9 ";.4" H0 7*67A76%.55, *08)97.906X 7" 60"78*06
9) .""%&0 9:.9 9:0 0Q0+497)* 6)0" *)9 0*()+4."" J J J ";.4
.8&00+0*9"S 9:0 90&+" )/ ;:7(: .&0 /7Q06 .*6 .&0 *)9 "%HY0(9 9)
*08)97.97)* 9:.9 /%*(97)*" 0""0*97.55, 7* 9:0 ".+0 +.**0& ." .*
0Q(:.*80 H%9 /)& 9:0 H75.90&.5 0Q0(%97)* )/ 9&.*".(97)*"J42
Pursuant to the CFTC’s ability to grant exceptions to the CEA’s
exchange trading requirement authorized by the 1992 FTPA, the CFTC by
rule in 1993 provided an exception from the CEA’s exchange trading
requirement for those swaps that were, 7*90& .57., “not part of a fungible
class of agreements that are standardized as to their material economic
terms[.]”43 Moreover, exempt swaps agreements were not to be “traded on
or through a multilateral transaction execution facility.”44 In laymen’s
terms, “a multilateral transaction execution facility” consists of one party
offering electronically a swaps agreement to many different other parties,
rather than merely offering agreements on a bilateral or one-on-one basis.45
F:0 -9.*6.&67K.97)* )/ -;.4" 9:&)%8: 9:0 !-D2 E."90& 28&00+0*9.
Even before the 1993 CFTC rule calling for negotiation of each of the
material economic terms of swap was promulgated, the International Swaps
and Derivatives Association (“ISDA” known then as the International
Swaps Dealers Association) in 1992 created a standardized and copyrighted
Master Agreement and related schedule to govern the execution of a swap.

41. Futures Trading Practices Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-546, § 502.
42. Exemption for Certain Swap Agreements, 58 Fed. Reg. 5587 (Jan. 22, 1993) (emphasis
added).
43. 17 C.F.R. § 35.2(b) (2009).
44J !6J at § 35.2(d).
45J -00 A New Regulatory Framework for Multilateral Transaction Execution Facilities,
Intermediaries and Clearing Organizations, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,989, 38,989 (June 22, 2000) (“The
Commission is proposing to define MTEF as ‘an electronic market or similar facility through
which persons, for their own accounts or for the accounts of others, enter into, agree to enter into
or execute binding transactions by accepting bids or offers made by one person that are open to
multiple persons conducting business through such market or similar facility.’”).
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ISDA “was chartered in 1985 and today has over 825 member
institutions.”46
The ISDA Master Agreement is 18 pages long with standardized,
boilerplate clauses, and each page carries with it a copyright in ISDA’s
name.47 It includes the fundamental provisions without which the swaps
transaction could not be understood.48 Included among the many
contractual points resolved by the ISDA Master Agreement are
“interpretation” principles (¶ 1); “obligations”, including “liability” (¶2);
“representations” (¶3); “agreements” (¶4); “events of default and
termination events” (¶5); “early termination” (¶6); “transfer” (¶7);
“contractual currency” (¶8); “remedies” (¶9); “expenses” (¶11); “notice”
(¶12); “governing law and jurisdiction” (¶13); and forty three “definitions”
governing the swaps transactions (¶14).49
Accompanying the ISDA Master Agreement is a “Schedule,” thirteen
pages long, derived directly from a standardized ISDA template for that
“Schedule,” which, in turn, provides a standardized menu of limited choices
to further define terms of the ISDA Master Agreement.50 The ISDA
template for the Schedule is itself copyrighted on every page in ISDA’s
name. The ISDA standardized template for the Schedule is dependent upon,
and references only, the ISDA Master Agreement.51
Also accompanying the ISDA Schedule is a standardized ISDA Credit
Support Annex, which is sixteen pages long and also includes copyrights in
ISDA’s name on every page except those relating to the last of thirteen
paragraphs.52 The first twelve paragraphs within the ISDA Credit Annex
are standardized boilerplate written by ISDA.53 Every page is once again
copyrighted in ISDA’s name.54 Only the last paragraph concerning
“elections and variables” is not standardized.55

46. News Release, Eraj Shirvani New Chairman of ISDA (April 16, 2008), .A.75.H50 .9
http://www.isda.org/press/press041608eraj.html.
47J -00 ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT, "%4&. note 27.
48J !6J
49J !6J
50J !6J at 19–24.
51J !6J
52J -00 INT’L SWAP DEALERS ASS’N, INC., CREDIT SUPPORT ANNEX TO THE SCHEDULE OF
THE ISDA MASTER AGREEMENT (1995), .A.75.H50 .9 http://kbc-pdf kbc.be/collateral_
management/Standard_csa.pdf.
53J !6J
54J !6J
55J !6J
VOL. 6 NO.1 2011
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F:0 CGFCb" E., TUU[ C)*(049 <050."0. By 1998, the swaps or the
“over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives” market was growing at a rapid
pace.56 As the CFTC noted:
Z"0 )/ $FC 60&7A.97A0" :." 8&);* .9 A0&, "%H"9.*97.5 &.90" )A0&
9:0 4."9 /0; ,0.&"J 2(()&67*8 9) 9:0 +)"9 &0(0*9 +.&>09 "%&A0, H,
R!-D2XS 9:0 *)97)*.5 A.5%0 )/ *0; 9&.*".(97)*" &04)&906 H, !-D2
+0+H0&" 7* 7*90&0"9 &.90 ";.4"S (%&&0*(, ";.4"S .*6 7*90&0"9 &.90
)497)*" 6%&7*8 9:0 /7&"9 :.5/ )/ TUU\ 7*(&0."06 cWd )A0& 9:0
4&0A7)%" "7QB+)*9: 40&7)6J F:0 *)97)*.5 A.5%0 )/ )%9"9.*67*8
()*9&.(9" 7* 9:0"0 7*"9&%+0*9" ;." e_[J\VV 9&7557)*S %4 T_JUd
/&)+ ,0.&B0*6 TUUWS W_J_d /&)+ ,0.&B0*6 TUU]S .*6 T]cJ_d
/&)+ ,0.&B0*6 TUUcJ !-D2b" TUUW +.&>09 "%&A0, *)906 9:.9 9:0&0
;0&0 WVVSVTW )%9"9.*67*8 ()*9&.(9" 7* 9:0"0 7*"9&%+0*9" ." )/
,0.&B0*6 TUUWS %4 c\d /&)+ ,0.&B0*6 TUU]S ;:7(: 7* 9%&*
&04&0"0*906 . c^J\d 7*(&0."0 )A0& ,0.&B0*6 TUUcJ J J J57
Also, these OTC derivatives were now, because of the ISDA Master
Agreement, so standardized that they could be traded electronically on a
multilateral basis, thereby exhibiting all of the trading characteristics of
traditional exchange traded standardized futures contracts.58 Because
swaps were increasingly standardized and traded multilaterally, however,
the market was not within the “safe harbors” exemption from the CEA
regulatory requirements and protections of the CEA provided by the 1989
Swaps Policy Statement or the 1993 Swaps exemption.59
On May 7, 1998, the CFTC promulgated a concept release on OTC
derivatives, finding that these standardized products were almost certainly
subject to the mandatory exchange trading requirement (and therefore were
trading in violation of law) and calling for public comment on the
development of various alternative regulatory features that would create an
§ 4 (c) exemption from the CEA’s mandatory exchange trading.60
Any new regulatory system would be applied “prospectively,” with the
existing market retroactively sanctioned under the CEA.61 The public was
asked to answer a series of questions pertaining to what, 7/ .*,, of the
56.
57J
58J
59J
60J
61J
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!6J at 26,115.
-00 76J at 26,116.
-00 76J at 26,116–18.
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!6J at 26,114.
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features of a fully regulated exchange trading requirement should be applied
to the swaps market, 0J8., reporting and disclosure, capital adequacy,
clearing, exchange trading, regulation of intermediaries, self regulation or
application of anti-fraud and anti-manipulation principles.62 The CFTC
expressly stated that it had no preconceived notion of the answer to these
questions.63
3&0BTUU[ -;.4" E.&>09 D,"/%*(97)*". The motivation for this May
1998 CFTC inquiry was the fact that unregulated swaps had caused so
many financial calamities.64 The CFTC noted:
2 *%+H0& )/ 5.&80S ;055 4%H57(7K06S /7*.*(7.5 5)""0" )A0& 9:0 5."9
/0; ,0.&" :.A0 /)(%"06 9:0 .990*97)* )/ 9:0 /7*.*(7.5 "0&A7(0"
7*6%"9&,S 79" &08%5.9)&"S 60&7A.97A0" 0*6B%"0&"S .*6 9:0 80*0&.5
4%H57( )* 4)90*97.5 4&)H50+" .*6 .H%"0" 7* 9:0 $FC 60&7A.97A0"
+.&>09J E.*, )/ 9:0"0 5)""0" :.A0 ()+0 9) 578:9 "7*(0 9:0 5."9
+.Y)& &08%5.9)&, .(97)*" H, 9:0 CGFC 7*A)5A7*8 $FC 60&7A.97A0"S
9:0 ";.4" .*6 :,H&76 7*"9&%+0*9" 0Q0+497)*" 7""%06 7* f.*%.&,
TUUVJ65
In footnote 6 of the concept release, the CFTC cited “Jerry A.
Markham, C)++)67970" <08%5.97)*@ G&.%6S E.*74%5.97)* g $9:0& C5.7+"S
Section 27.05 nn. 2-22.1 (1997) (listing 22 examples of significant losses in
financial derivatives transactions) [and] a 1997 GAO Report 4 (stating that
the GAO identified 360 substantial end-user losses).”
The most prominent scandals deriving from swaps by May 1998
included the 1994 bankruptcy of Orange County, the largest municipal
default in the Nation’s history.66 Orange County was one of the country’s
wealthiest counties, and it’s fifth most populous.67 Having executed many
poorly understood interest rate swaps, the county suddenly found itself
facing massive debt as interest rates quickly rose.68 It lost approximately
$1.6 billion.69 Merrill Lynch agreed to pay $400 million to Orange County
62J !6J at 26,119–27.
63J !6J at 26,114.
64J !6J at 26,115.
65J !6. at 26,115.
66. MARK BALDASSARE, WHEN GOVERNMENT FAILS: THE ORANGE COUNTY BANKRUPTCY
1 (1998).
67J !6J
68J !6J at 2.
69J !6J at 3.
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to settle claims involving the derivatives that caused Orange County’s
bankruptcy.70
Also beginning in 1994, two large corporate clients of Bankers Trust,
Gibson Greetings and Procter & Gamble, successfully sued that bank for
defrauding them in the sale of complicated unregulated derivatives, thereby
causing large customer losses.71 Central to that litigation success were over
6,500 tape recordings of Bankers Trust employees acknowledging to each
other that the bank’s clients did not understand the adverse impact the
derivatives transactions would have on them.72
The SEC and CFTC took cooperative enforcement actions against
Bankers Trust for violating the antifraud provisions of the federal securities
and commodities laws in connection with OTC derivatives it marketed.73
The SEC found that Bankers Trust violated various sections of the
securities laws, including making false statements or omissions in the sale
of securities, supplying materially inaccurate valuations of derivatives
transactions, and failing to supervise marketing personnel.74 The CFTC
asserted that Bankers Trust, by its conduct, had assumed the role of a
commodity trading advisor and had violated the antifraud provisions of the
CEA governing such parties’ activities.75
$44)"797)* 9) 9:0 CGFC C)*(049 <050."0J The CFTC’s sister agencies
(the Treasury, the Federal Reserve, and the SEC) within the President’s
Working Group were strongly opposed to the CFTC’s concept release

70. Andrew Pollack & Leslie Wayne, '*67*8 -%79S E0&&755 L,*(: 9) 3., C.57/)&*7. C)%*9, e
c^^ E7557)*, N.Y. TIMES, Jun. 3, 1998, .A.75.H50 .9 http://www nytimes.com/1998/06/
03/business/ending-suit-merrill-lynch-to-pay-california-county-400-million html?pagewanted=all.
71J -00 Saul Hansell, =.*>0&" F&%"9 -09950" -%79 ;79: 3Jg h, N.Y. TIMES, May 10, 1996,
.A.75.H50 .9 http://www nytimes.com/1996/05/10/business/bankers-trust-settles-suit-with-p-g html
(“Paying a steep price to end a bitter battle, the Bankers Trust New York Corporation agreed
yesterday to forgive most of the nearly $200 million the bank contended it was owed by Procter &
Gamble over two complex transactions in 1993.”); Bloomberg Business News, G)&+0& =.*>0&"
F&%"9 F&.60& -09950" C:.&80" 7* D0&7A.97A0" C."0, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 1996, .A.75.H50 .9
http://www nytimes.com/1996/03/01/business/former-bankers-trust-trader-settles-charges-inderivatives-case html (“Gibson said it lost more than $6 million in derivatives trading and sued
Bankers Trust. The companies settled the suit in November 1994.”).
72. Kelley Holland et. al, F:0 =.*>0&" F&%"9 F.40", BUSINESSWEEK, Oct. 16, 1995, .A.75.H50
.9 http://www.businessweek.com/1995/42/b34461 htm.
73. U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO/GGD-98-5, OTC DERIVATIVES:
ADDITIONAL OVERSIGHT COULD REDUCE COSTLY SALES PRACTICES DISPUTES 8 (1997).
74J !6J at 44.
75J !6J at 46.
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inquiry.76 In response to a request from the remaining members of the
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets—issued on the very day
the concept release was published—Congress eventually enacted a six
month statutory moratorium to the CFTC concept release.77
F:0 LFCE C&7"7"J In September 1998, Long-Term Capital
Management (“LTCM”), which was up until that time the country’s largest
and most successful hedge fund, nearly collapsed from the loss, over a
period of weeks, of $4.6 billion (or about 90% of its capital) on lost bets
from, 7*90& .57., OTC derivatives positions.78 It was feared that LTCM’s
collapse would have created the cascading failure of many of its
counterparties, which were the hedge fund’s OTC derivative counterparties
and creditors, including some of the world’s largest financial institutions.79
So concerned were those financial institutions about the systemic effect of
LTCM’s failure that, under the auspices of the New York Federal Reserve,
on September 23, 1998 (with about 48 hours notice of the systemic impact
of LTCM’s potential collapse) fourteen of those institutions contributed a
total of $3.6 billion to buy out the fund to keep it from failing.80
F:0 3&0"760*9b" M)&>7*8 h&)%4b" TUUU <04)&9 )* LFCE. After a full
day of hearings before the House Financial Services Committee on October
1, 1998 on the LTCM crisis, the President’s Working Group (“PWG”) was
asked to prepare a report on the LTCM failure and recommend actions to
prevent such a potentially systemic financial collapse in the future.81 In
April 1999, the PWG issued that report. It noted: “The near collapse of
Long-Term Capital Management (“LTCM”), a private sector investment
firm, highlighted the possibility that problems at one financial institution
could be transmitted to other institutions, and potentially pose risks to the
financial system.”82
76J G&)*957*0@ F:0 M.&*7*8 (PBS television broadcast Oct. 20, 2009) .A.75.H50 .9
http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/warning/etc/script html.
77J -00 REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, OVERTHE-COUNTER DERIVATIVES MARKETS AND THE COMMODITY EXCHANGE ACT 12–13, 15 (1999)
(discussing legislation limiting the CFTC’s rulemaking authority).
78J -00 76J (discussing LTCM’s near collapse in September 1998 due to its inability to reduce
its positions because of the large size of those positions).
79J -00 76J at 15 (describing how LTCM’s counterparties’ exposures were “not adequately
assessed, priced, or collateralized relative to the potential price shocks the markets were facing at
the end of September 1998, relative to the creditworthiness of the LTCM Fund at that time”).
80J !6J at 14.
81J -00 80*0&.55, 76J at 29 (summarizing the conclusions and recommendations by the
President’s Working Group on Financial Markets).
82J !6J at viii.
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One of the major recommendations of the April 1999 PWG report was
that the SEC, the CFTC and the Treasury receive expanded authority to
require OTC derivative counterparties to provide credit risk information,
recordkeeping and reporting and data on concentrations, trading strategies
and risk models, as well as providing the government the ability to inspect
risk management models.83 Fed Chairman Greenspan declined to endorse
this set of recommendations, but deferred to those regulators with
supervisory authority.84
F:0 C)%*90&4.&9, <7"> E.*.80+0*9 3)57(, h&)%4 <04)&9 )* 9:0
LFCE C&7"7". Shortly after the LTCM episode, twelve of the world’s largest
banks formed the Counterparty Risk Management Policy Group
(“CRMPG”) to conduct a self-study of practices that led to the LTCM crisis
and to recommend self regulatory practices that would prevent such an
episode from reoccurring.85 In June 1999, CRMPG issued a detailed 57page report, which acknowledged faulty supervision of OTC swaps’ desks
within their institutions and promised a broad array of management
practices, including improved supervision, reporting and market practices
pertaining to OTC derivatives.86 Included within CRMPG’s
recommendations was a commitment to meet informally and periodically
with their primary government regulator to discuss OTC market trends and
conditions, including providing reports “detailing certain large exposure
information on a consolidated basis group.”87
Illustrative of a problem that would reoccur in these markets is an
observation about the lack of proper documentation of OTC derivatives
transactions.88 CRMPG states:
F:0 85)H.5 /7*.*(7.5 +.&>09" )40&.90 9:&)%8: .* 7*90&()**0(906
"0&70" )/ ()*9&.(9" .+)*8 +.&>09 4.&97(74.*9"J J J 259:)%8:
;&7990* 6)(%+0*9" +., *)9 H0S 40& "0S *0(0"".&, 9) 0"9.H57": .
()*9&.(9S 9:0, .&0 9:0 H0"9 0A760*(0 )/ 9:0 90&+" )/ . ()*9&.(9 .*6
9:0 H0"9 ;., 9) 0*"%&0 9:.9 4.&970" .8&00 )* 9:0 "40(7/7( 90&+" )/
83J !6J at 39–40.
84J !6J at 40 n.23.
85. COUNTERPARTY RISK MANAGEMENT POLICY GROUP, IMPROVING COUNTERPARTY RISK
MANAGEMENT PRACTICES 2 (1999).
86J -00 80*0&.55, 76J at 24 (discussing the improvement of risk estimation, management and
reporting).
87J !6J at 10–11.
88J !6J at 37 (“Failure to document a transaction appropriately or expeditiously, therefore,
creates risk.”).
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. 9&.*".(97)*J G.75%&0 9) 6)(%+0*9 . 9&.*".(97)* .44&)4&7.905, )&
0Q406797)%"5,S 9:0&0/)&0S (&0.90" &7"> RJ J JXJ89
F:0 TUUU 3Mh <04)&9 <0()++0*67*8 D0&08%5.97)* )/ -;.4". The
major thrust of the CRMPG report was to oppose “new regulation . . . . It
would be a mistake to attempt to codify risk management practices in that
fashion.”90 Not only were no new regulations promulgated (nor were the
informal meetings with regulators proposed by CRMPG ever initiated), by
November 1999, the PWG (in a seeming reversal from its April 1999
Report) recommended to Congress that financial OTC derivatives totally be
deregulated.91 In a cover letter for that report, then Secretary of the
Treasury Lawrence Summers explained:
$A0&B9:0B()%*90& 60&7A.97A0" :.A0 9&.*"/)&+06 9:0 ;)&56 )/
/7*.*(0S 7*(&0."7*8 9:0 &.*80 )/ /7*.*(7.5 4&)6%(9" .A.75.H50 9)
()&4)&.97)*" .*6 7*A0"9)&" .*6 /)"90&7*8 +)&0 4&0(7"0 ;.," )/
%*60&"9.*67*8S I%.*97/,7*8S .*6 +.*.87*8 &7">J F:0"0 7+4)&9.*9
+.&>09" .&0 5.&80 .*6 8&);7*8 &.4765,J 29 9:0 0*6 )/ TUU[S 9:0
0"97+.906 *)97)*.5 A.5%0 )/ $FC 60&7A.97A0 ()*9&.(9" ;." e[^
9&7557)*S .(()&67*8 9) 9:0 =.*> /)& !*90&*.97)*.5 -09950+0*9"J !*
.66797)*S 9:0"0 85)H.5 +.&>09" :.A0 H00* +.&>06 H, 7**)A.97)* 7*
4&)6%(9" .*6 9&.67*8 .*6 "09950+0*9 +0(:.*7"+"J
2 (5)%6 )/ 508.5 %*(0&9.7*9, :." :%*8 )A0& 9:0 $FC 60&7A.97A0"
+.&>09" 7* 9:0 Z*7906 -9.90" 7* &0(0*9 ,0.&"S ;:7(:S 7/ *)9
.66&0""06S ()%56 67"()%&.80 7**)A.97)* .*6 8&);9: )/ 9:0"0
7+4)&9.*9 +.&>09" .*6 6.+.80 ZJ-J 50.60&":74 7* 9:0"0 .&0*." H,
6&7A7*8 9&.*".(97)*" )//B":)&0J J J J92
The central and key recommendation within the PWG 1999 Report
with respect to OTC derivatives was that Congress provide “[a]n exclusion
from the CEA[‘s regulatory requirements] for bilateral transactions between
sophisticated counterparties (other than transactions that involve nonfinancial commodities with finite supplies). . . .”93
F:0 C)++)679, G%9%&0" E)60&*7K.97)* 2(9 )/ _^^^b" D0&08%5.97)* )/
-;.4". Accordingly, on December 15, 2000, Congress passed and on
89J
90.
91J
92J
93J

!6J (emphasis added).
Greenberger, "%4&. note 40, at 9.
!6J
!6J
-00 "%4&. note 78, at 2.
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December 21, 2000, President Clinton signed into law the Commodity
Futures Modernization Act of 2000 (“CFMA”).94 The CFMA removed
OTC derivatives transactions, including energy futures transactions, from
all requirements of exchange trading and clearing under the CEA so long as
the counterparties to the swap were “eligible contract participants.”95
Generally speaking, a counterparty to be an “eligible contract participant”
had to have in excess of $10 million in total assets with some limited
exceptions allowing lesser amounts in the case of an individual using the
swap for risk management purposes.96
Thus, the OTC derivatives market (at that time according to Secretary
Summers amounting to $80 trillion notional value) was exempt from the
CEA’s capital adequacy requirements; reporting and disclosure; regulation
of intermediaries; self regulation; any bars on fraud, manipulation97 and
excessive speculation; and requirements for clearing. The SEC was
similarly barred from OTC derivatives oversight except for the limited
fraud jurisdiction it maintained over securities-based swaps.98
Recognizing that the deregulation of swaps would remove the Act’s
bar against excessive speculation in regulated exchange traded futures, the
CFMA also expressly preempted state gaming and anti-bucket shop laws,99
which would have barred the otherwise unregulated speculative activity
authorized by the CFMA.100
Finally, to ensure that not even the CFMA itself could be used as a
basis to challenge the legality of a swap, the Act provides that

94. Commodity Futures Modernization Act of 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-554, 114 Stat. 2763.
95J -00 Greenberger, "%4&. note 40, at 9.
96. DERIVATIVES REGULATION, "%4&. note 15, at 328–29.
97. Unlike financial swaps, which were “0Q(5%606” from the exchange trading requirement,
including fraud and manipulation prohibitions, energy and metals swaps, while relieved of the
exchange trading, continued to be subject to fraud and manipulation prohibitions; they were
therefore labeled by the CFMA as “0Q0+49” transactions. !6J Compare § 2(g) (relating to financial
swaps) with § 2(h) relating to energy and metals swaps. !6J -00 .5") CHARLES W. EDWARDS ET.
AL., COMMODITY FUTURES MODERNIZATION ACT OF 2000: LAW AND EXPLANATION at 28 (2001)
(quoting remarks of Sen. Tom Harkin, 146 Cong. Rec. S11896, December 15, 2000, “The Act
continues the CFTC’s antifraud and anti-manipulation authority with regard to exempt transaction
in energy and metals derivative markets.”). By exempting metals and energy swaps from
exchange trading, Congress disagreed with the unanimous recommendation of the PWG that
swaps concerning “finite” supplies not be removed from the exchange trading mandate of the
CEA. !6J
98J -00 Greenberger, "%4&. note 40, at 10.
99J -00 DERIVATIVES REGULATION, "%4&. note 15, at 975.
100J !6J
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R*X) .8&00+0*9S ()*9&.(9S )& 9&.*".(97)* H09;00* 05787H50
()*9&.(9 4.&97(74.*9" J J J ":.55 H0 A)76S A)76.H50S )&
%*0*/)&(0.H50 J J J H."06 ")505, )* 9:0 /.75%&0 J J J 9) ()+45, ;79:
9:0 90&+" )& ()*6797)*" )/ .* 0Q0+497)* )& 0Q(5%"7)* /&)+ .*,
4&)A7"7)* )/ 9:7" (:.490& )& &08%5.97)*" )/ 9:0 C)++7""7)*J101
C)*(5%"7)*" .H)%9 9:0 D0&08%5.9)&, '//0(9 )/ 9:0 CGE2. In sum, what
was then estimated to be the multi-trillion dollar OTC derivatives market
was removed from almost all pertinent federal and state enforcement to
which trading markets had been subject since the New Deal, as well as a
central premise of the common law of contracts, 7J0JS that illegal contracts
are subject to a declaration of unenforceability.102 In effect, almost no law
applied to this market.103
Years later, during the Troubled Asset Relief Program (“TARP”)
hearings in September 2008, then-SEC Chairman Christopher Cox warned
Congress about the need for “immediate legislative action,” because he
viewed OTC credit derivatives market as a “regulatory blackhole,” based on
the deregulatory provisions adopted within the CFMA.104
The Economic Meltdown as a Failure of OTC Derivatives Regulation

Although many factors contributed to the financial meltdown of 2007 and
2008, principal among them was the collapse of the market in OTC
derivatives. The OTC market in credit default swaps and synthetic
collateralized debt obligations provided the trigger that launched the
mortgage crisis, credit crisis, and systemic financial crisis that threatened to
implode the global financial system, were it not for a multi-trillion dollar
U.S. taxpayer intervention.105 At the time of the crisis, this market was
101. 7 U.S.C. § 25 (a)(4) (2006) (emphasis added).
102J -00 Greenberger, "%4&. note 40, at 10.
103J !6J
104. Robert O’Harrow, Jr. and Brady Dennis, D);*8&.60" .*6 D);*/.55, WASH. POST, Dec.
31, 2008, at A1(stating “‘The regulatory blackhole for credit-default swaps is one of the most
significant issues we are confronting in the current credit crisis,’ Cox said, ‘and it requires
immediate legislative action.’”).
105J -00 80*0&.55, Vikas Bajaj, -%&4&7"0" 7* . C5)"0& L))> .9 C&0679BD0/.%59 -;.4", N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 5, 2008, at B0; Peter S. Goodman, F.>7*8 ?.&6 O0; L))> .9 . h&00*"4.* L08.(,,
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008, at A0; Jon Hilsenrath et al., M)&"9 C&7"7" -7*(0 iV^"S M79: *) '*6 j09 7*
-78:9, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at A1; F:0 G7*.*(7.5 C&7"7" .*6 9:0 <)50 )/ G060&.5
<08%5.9)&"@ ?0.&7*8 H0/)&0 9:0 C)++79900 )* $A0&"78:9 .*6 h)A0&*+0*9 <0/)&+, 111th Cong.
(Oct. 23, 2008), .A.75.H50 .9 http://clipsandcomment.com/wp-content/uploads/2008/10/greenspantestimony-20081023.pdf (prepared testimony of Dr. Alan Greenspan).
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estimated to have a notional value of $596 trillion, including approximately
$58 trillion in credit default swaps (“CDSs”),106 yet federal regulators (and
most state regulators) were barred by a federal statute from ensuring
stability in these transactions.107 Before explaining below the manner in
which credit default swaps (sometimes referred to as synthetic collaterized
debt obligations) fomented this crisis, it is worth citing in the margin those
many economists,108 regulators,109 market observers,110 and financial
106. Naohiko Babo & Paola Gallardo, $FC E.&>09 2(97A79, 7* 9:0 -0()*6 ?.5/ )/ _^^\, BANK
INTERNATIONAL SETTLEMENTS (May 2008), .A.75.H50 .9 http://www.bis.org/publ/otc
_hy0805.pdf.
107. Michael Greenberger, !" $%& '()*)+, -./01 2 3&)4)".5 /)& 266&0""7*8 9:0 -%((0"" )/
-;.4" <08%5.97)*, 7* WILL IT WORK? HOW WILL WE KNOW? THE FUTURE OF FINANCIAL
REFORM 37 (Michael Konczal ed., 2010).
108J -00 Moshinsky, "%4&. note 1; Blinder, "%4&. note 1; Hu, supra note 1; Krugman, supra
note 1; James K. Galbraith, Statement before the Subcommittee on Crime Senate Judiciary
Committee (May 4, 2010), .A.75.H50 .9 http://utip.gov.utexas.edu/Flyers/GalbraithMay4
SubCommCrimeRV.pdf.
109. Edmund L. Andrews, h&00*"4.* C)*(060" '&&)& )* <08%5.97)*, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24,
2008; Anthony Faiola et al., M:.9 M0*9 M&)*8, WASH. POST, Oct. 15, 2008; Peter S. Goodman,
F.>7*8 ?.&6 O0; L))> .9 9:0 h&00*"4.* L08.(,, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 2008; ?0.&7*8 9) <0A70;
9:0 <)50 )/ C&0679 D0&7A.97A0" 7* 9:0 ZJ-J '()*)+,@ ?0.&7*8 H0/)&0 9:0 ?)%"0 )/ <04&0"0*9.97A0"
C)++79900
)*
28&7(%59%&0,
110th
Cong.
(Nov.
20,
2008)
.A.75.H50
.9
http://www.ins.state ny.us/speeches/pdf/sp0811201.pdf (prepared testimony of Eric Dinallo,
Superintendent, New York State Insurance Dept); Gary Gensler, Remarks at OTC Derivatives
Reform, Chatham House, London (Mar. 18, 2010) (stating that “OTC derivatives were at the
center of the 2008 financial crisis” and “Capital requirements should take into account the unique
risks that credit default swaps (CDS) pose”); Greenspan, "%4&. note 104; Greg Robb, <))9" )/
C&0679 C&7"7" L.76 .9 G06b" D))&, MARKET WATCH (Oct. 24, 2007),
http://www marketwatch.com/story/roots-of-credit-crisis-found-at-the-feds-door-says-expert.
110J -00 INVESTOR’S WORKING GROUP, U.S. FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM: THE
INVESTORS’ PERSPECTIVE, 1 (July 2009), .A.75.H50 .9
http://www.cii.org/UserFiles/file/resource%20center/investment%20issues/Investors'%20Working
%20Group%20Report%20(July%202009).pdf (listing the fundamental flaws of the U.S. financial
services sector exposed by the credit crisis: “ . . . gaps in oversight that let purveyors of abusive
mortgages, complex over-the-counter (OTC) derivatives and convoluted securitized products run
amok; woefully underfunded regulatory agencies; and super-sized financial institutions that are
both ‘too big to fail’ and too labyrinthine to regulate or manage effectively”); Jonathan Berr,
h0)&80 -)&)" ;.*9" 9) )%95.; (&0679 60/.%59 ";.4", DAILYFINANCE, (June 12, 2009),
http://www.dailyfinance.com/story/george-soros-wants-to-outlaw-credit-defaultswaps/19065423/# (“Credit default swaps, insurance contracts on securities in the event of a
default, are widely blamed as one of the causes of the current financial crisis. The unregulated,
$70 trillion market became unhinged when the real estate market, particularly houses funded
through subprime mortgages, collapsed.”); Henny Sender, h&00*578:9 C.479.5 /)%*60&RD.A76
'7*:)*X (.55" /)& CD- H.*, FINANCIAL TIMES, Nov. 6, 2009, (quoting Greenlight Capital founder
David Einhorn: “. . . trying to make safer credit default swaps is like trying to make safer asbestos
. . . [as CDSs create] large, correlated and asymmetrical risks”) .A.75.H50 .9
http://www ft.com/cms/s/0/6b1945e6-caf9-11de-97e0-00144feabdc0 html;
Janet
Tavakoli,
M.":7*89)* E%"9 =.* ZJ-J C&0679 D0&7A.97A0" ." F&.60&" D0+.*6 h)56 `3.&9 $*0a, HUFFINGTON
FOR
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columnists111 who have described the central role unregulated CDS played
in the crisis.112
-;.4" .*6 9:0 '()*)+7( E0596);*J CDSs were the last step in a
subprime securitization process that came to undermine the economy.113 A
counterparty investing in a CDS paid a “premium” to a counterparty for the
latter to agree to “guarantee” parts of another financial instrument, a
collateralized debt obligation (“CDO”), would not fail.114 Thus, a CDS can
be seen as a form of insurance on the success of specified tranches of a
CDO.115 CDOs, in turn, involved the “pulling together and dissection into
‘tranches’ of huge numbers of [mortgage-backed securities (“MBSs”)],”
based for their part on mortgage loans and, in the years before the crisis,
subprime mortgages in particular.116
Importantly, by “reframing the form of risk (e.g., from subprime
mortgages to MBSs to CDOs),” investors, providing the guarantees or
insurance of the subprime market through CDSs, thought that their
POST, March 8, 2010, .A.75.H50 .9 http://www huffingtonpost.com/janet-tavakoli/washingtonmust-ban-us-cr_b_489778 html (“Congress should act immediately to abolish credit default swaps
on the United States, because these derivatives will foment distortions in global currencies and
gold.”).
111J -00 LAWRENCE G. MCDONALD & PATRICK ROBINSON, A COLOSSAL FAILURE OF
COMMON SENSE: THE INSIDE STORY OF THE COLLAPSE OF LEHMAN BROTHERS (2009); Robert
Johnson, C&067H50 <0")5%97)* k M:.9 !9 F.>0" 9) '*6 F)) =78 9) G.75, 7* ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE:
MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 117–133 (2009) (“The recent crisis in the U.S. centered on the
collapse of the housing bubble and the role of leverage, off balance sheet exposures, and complex
OTC derivatives.”); Vikas Bajaj, -%&4&7"0" 7* . C5)"0& L))> .9 C&0679BD0/.%59 -;.4", N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 5, 2008 (“Policy makers have been unnerved by the rise of the [CDS] market because they
are worried that sellers of protection may not have enough reserves to pay future claims and that
default by one party could lead to a cascade of failures throughout the financial system.”); Jon
Hilsenrath, et al., M)&"9 C&7"7" -7*(0 bV^"S M79: O) '*6 !* -78:9, WALL ST. J., Sept. 18, 2008, at
A1 (“The latest trouble spot [in the financial crisis] is an area called credit-default swaps . . .”);
Jeff Madrick, 29 9:0 ?0.&9 )/ 9:0 C&.":, NY REVIEW OF BOOKS, (June 10, 2010) (reviewing
MICHAEL LEWIS, THE BIG SHORT: INSIDE THE DOOMSDAY MACHINE (2010)), .A.75.H50 .9
http://www nybooks.com/articles/archives/2010/jun/10/heart-crash/?pagination=false (“As we
now know, derivatives were the instruments that enabled Wall Street to stretch capital
dangerously far – and were at the center of the financial crisis that began that year.”); Gretchen
Morgenson, O.>06 C.+0 9:0 -40(%5.9)&", N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 10, 2008, (“As the sheriffs begin to
confront the C.D.S. cowboys, more losses are bound to show up in this Wild West.”).
112J -00 "%4&. notes 109–11.
113. Michael Greenberger, $%9 )/ 9:0 =5.(> ?)50@ <08%5.9)&, <0/)&+ )/ 9:0 $A0&B9:0BC)%*90&
D0&7A.97A0" E.&>09, 7* ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE: MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 99, at 100–02
(2010), .A.75.H50 .9 http://www michaelgreenberger.com/files/Greenberger-Derivatives-MMBM
.pdf.
114J !6J at 100.
115J !6J
116J !6J
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investments were safe.117 This problem was compounded by “misleadingly
high evaluations” by credit rating agencies and, of course, the insurance
provided by CDSs.118 In addition, issuers of CDSs relied upon the faulty
assumption that housing prices would never go down, so that they would
never have to pay the guarantees they were providing.119
Because CDSs were widely understood to be risk-free, financial
institutions began writing “naked” CDSs (sometimes referred to as
synthetic collateralized debt obligations) to investors who had no direct
investment in CDOs or MBSs.120 That is, investors bet with relatively
small insurance-type premiums that certain handpicked mortgage-based
instruments would fail, and they would receive a hefty payment if they
did.121 Estimates suggest that before the crisis, there were at least as many
“naked” CDSs as those based on actual risk.122
All of this came to a head when housing prices began to plummet.123
Homeowners began to default on loans, leading to the failure of CDOs and
triggering obligations of CDS issuers.124 Synthetic CDOs and naked CDSs
added exponentially to the obligations owed.125 However, because they
believed that the guarantees would never be triggered, issuers had not set
aside sufficient capital to pay them off and therefore could not honor their
contractual commitments.126 In addition, because the investments were not
reported to regulators, both the government and the financial community
were surprised by the size of the market, which led to uncertainty and a
tightening of credit.127 All of this resulted in the downward cycle of the
economic meltdown, exacerbated by the fact that CDOs and CDSs existed
not just in the subprime mortgage market, but in most credit markets.128
The analysis surrounding this subject estimates that there may have
been three to four times as many “naked” CDS instruments extant at the

117J
118J
119J
120J
121J
122J
123J
124J
125J
126J
127J
128J
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time of the meltdown than CDSs guaranteeing actual risk.129 This means
that to the extent the guarantor of a CDS (0J8JS AIG) had to be rescued by
the U.S. taxpayer, the chances were very high that the “bail out” was of
failed naked CDS bets that mortgages would be paid.130 (Prominent
Members of Congress have maintained that the holders of bets that
mortgages would fail have formed a strong political constituency against
the “rescue” of subprime borrowers through the adjustment of mortgages to
keep homeowners from defaulting.)131
The fact that “naked” CDS and “synthetic” CDOs were nothing more
than “bets” on the viability of the subprime market also demonstrates the
importance of the CFMA expressly preempting state gaming and antibucket shop laws.132 Had those laws not been preempted, it is almost
certain that at least some states would have banned these investments as
unlicensed gambling or illegal bucket shops.133 An action of this sort by
even a single state would have disrupted the “naked” CDS market
throughout the country.134
Moreover, doubtless because Eric Dinallo, in his then capacity as New
York Insurance Superintendent, seriously considered regulating CDS as
insurance135 and because the National Council of Insurance Legislators

129J !6J at 101. -00 The Role of Financial Derivatives in the Current Financial Crisis: Hearing
before the Senate Agricultural CommJS TT^9: C)*8J .9 V `$(9J TcS _^^[a available at
http://www.ins.state.ny.us/speeches/pdf/sp0810141.pdf (prepared testimony of Eric Dinallo,
Superintendent, New York State Insurance Dept. )(“. . . [I]t appears that swaps on that debt could
total at least three times as much as the actual debt outstanding.”)l D.;* m)40(>7 .*6 -:.**)* DJ
?.&&7*89)*S Banning ‘Naked’ Default Swaps May Raise Corporate Funding CostsS N.Y. TIMESS
f%5, _cS _^^U available at http://www nytimes.com/2010/04/19/opinion/19krugman html?dbkJ
130J -00 DinalloS "%4&. note 129, at 3–4.
131J -00 Ryan Grim, D7(> D%&H7*@ =.*>" PG&.*>5, $;* F:0 35.(0n, HUFFINGTON POST,
April 29, 2009, .A.75.H50 .9 http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2009/04/29/dick-durbin-banksfrankly_n_193010 html (referring to rising number of Senate Democrats’ opposition to cram
down).
132. DERIVATIVES REGULATION, "%4&. note 15, at 975 (referencing 7 U.S.C. § 16(e)(2)).
133J -00 Dinallo, "%4&. note 129, at 4–5.
134. Greenberger, "%4&. note 40.
135. Press Release, New York State Insurance Dept., Recognizing Progress by Federal
Government in Developing Oversight Framework for Credit Default Swaps, New York Will Stay
Plan to Regulate Some Credit Default Swaps (Nov. 20, 2008) (“Dinallo announced that New York
had determined that some credit default swaps were subject to regulation under state insurance
law and that the New York State Insurance Department would begin to regulate them on January
1, 2009.”).
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were working on a model code to regulate CDS as insurance,136 Wall Street
lobbyists ensured that the Dodd-Frank Act would also preempt state
insurance law as it applies to swaps that are neither cleared or exchange
traded.137
Interconnectedness: The Systemic Risk Derived from All Types of Swaps

-;.4" $9:0& F:.* CD- ?.A0 C.%"06 -0&7)%" G7*.*(7.5 D7"5)(.97)*".
While CDSs and synthetic CDOs almost certainly lit the fuse that led to the
recent explosive financial destabilization, the remainder of the OTC market
has historically led to other destabilizing events in the economy. These
include the recent energy and food commodity bubble,138 the near failure of
LTCM in 1998, the Bankers Trust scandal and the Orange Country
bankruptcy of 1994, and now the causative factor of the European sovereign
debt crisis (cross currency swaps masking the full extent of sovereign
debt).139
Z*&08%5.906 $FC D0&7A.97A0" )/ 255 m7*6" C.%"0 PF)) =78 F) G.75n
!*"979%97)*"J However, even if looking only at the recent financial crisis, the
remainder of the unregulated OTC derivatives market was central to the
crisis’ causation. That is because the remainder of the OTC derivative
market relates directly to the interconnectedness of swaps commitments that
made large financial institutions “too big to fail.” The prevention of a
cascading collapse of the financial system therefore required the American
taxpayer to bail out many of those huge financial entities because of their
non-CDS swaps commitments.140

136J -00 NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF INSURANCE LEGISLATORS, CREDIT DEFAULT
INSURANCE
MODEL
LEGISLATION
(Nov.
22,
2009),
.A.75.H50
.9
http://www ncoil.org/HomePage/2010/03212010CDIModel.pdf.
137. Restoring American Financial Stability Act of 2010, H.R. 4173, 111th Cong. § 722(b)
(2010).
138J -00 80*0&.55, ?0.&7*8 =0/)&0 9:0 ?)%"0 '*0&8, .*6 C)++0&(0 -%H()++79900 )*
$A0&"78:9 .*6 !*A0"978.97)*" <08.&67*8 '*0&8, -40(%5.97)*@ !" h&0.90& <08%5.97)* O0(0"".&, 9)
-9)4 3&7(0 E.*74%5.97)*1 k 3.&9 !! (2008), .A.75.H50 .9 http://michaelgreenberger
.com/files/June_23_2008_testimony.pdf (prepared testimony of Michael Greenberger, Law
School Prof., Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law); ?0.&7*8 H0/)&0 9:0 C)++)679, G%9%&0" F&.67*8
C)++7""7)* )* 'Q(0""7A0 -40(%5.97)*@ 3)"797)* L7+79" .*6 'Q0+497)*" (2009), .A.75.H50 .9
http://michaelgreenberger.com/files/CFTC_AFR_Sign_On_Testimony_August_3.pdf (prepared
testimony of Michael Greenberger, Law School Prof., Univ. of Md. Sch. of Law).
139. Louise Story et. al, M.55 -9J ?05406 9) E."> D0H9" -:.>7*8 '%&)40, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 13,
2010, at A0.
140J -00 Johnson, "%4&. note 111, at 117–33 (“America cannot end Too Big to Fail without
derivatives reform.”).
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F:0 L0:+.* =.*>&%49(,J As the Lehman bankruptcy proceedings
revealed, Lehman was a counterparty or guarantor of over 930,000 OTC
derivatives.141 To the extent that these contracts did not involve CDS, they
certainly involved unregulated interest rate, currency, foreign exchange, and
energy swaps.142
The Lehman liquidators are now embarked in a huge battle with
Lehman’s OTC derivative counterparties, claiming that those counterparties
have greatly exaggerated the value of amounts owed by Lehman pursuant to
those derivatives.143 The liquidators have filed a law suit against Nomura,
which has submitted $1 billion in counterparty swaps claims to the Lehman
estate. Lehman asserts that [a]bout 6,000 derivatives claims—totaling
$60bn in losses—were filed against Lehman’s US estate . . . , including
claims from about 40 of the largest US banks.”144
=0.& -90.&*" !*90&()**0(906*0"". As further evidence of the
interconnectedness of OTC derivative counterparties, on April 3, 2008,
New York Fed President Timothy Geithner explained after the Bear Stearns
collapse:
F:0 "%660* 67"()A0&, H, =0.&b" 60&7A.97A0 ()%*90&4.&970" 9:.9
7+4)&9.*9 /7*.*(7.5 4)"797)*" 9:0, :.6 4%9 7* 45.(0 9) 4&)90(9
9:0+"05A0" /&)+ /7*.*(7.5 &7"> ;0&0 *) 5)*80& )40&.97A0 ;)%56
:.A0 9&7880&06 "%H"9.*97.5 /%&9:0& 67"5)(.97)* 7* +.&>09"J F:7"
;)%56 :.A0 4&0(7479.906 . &%": H, =0.&b" ()%*90&4.&970" 9)
57I%76.90 9:0 ()55.90&.5 9:0, :056 .8.7*"9 9:)"0 4)"797)*" .*6 9)
.990+49 9) &0457(.90 9:)"0 4)"797)*" 7* .5&0.6, A0&, /&.8750
+.&>09"J145

141. GuyLaine Charles, $FC D0&7A.97A0 C)*9&.(9" 7* =.*>&%49(,@ F:0 L0:+.* 'Q40&70*(0, 13
N.Y. BUS. L. J. 14, 16 (2009).
142J -00 76Jl Andrew Ackerman, C)%&9 9) D0(760 G.90 )/ L0:+.* C)*9&.(9", THE BOND
BUYER, Dec. 15, 2008, http://www.bondbuyer.com/issues/117_238/-297451-1 html (“Though . . .
[Lehman Brothers Holdings] does not provide specific numbers for each category of swap,
derivatives market participants believe that roughly 20% to 30% of the contracts are municipal
securities-based interest rate swaps.”).
143. Megan Murphy & Anousha Sakoui, O)+%&. -%06 )A0& L0:+.* C5.7+", FINANCIAL
TIMES, Apr. 24, 2010 at 9.
144J !6J
145. Letter from Warren E. Buffett, Chairman of the Board, Berkshire Hathaway Inc., to the
Shareholders of Berkshire Hathaway Inc. (Feb. 27, 2009), .A.75.H50 .9 http://www.
berkshirehathaway.com/letters/2008ltr.pdf.
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Citing this quote, Warren Buffet concluded: “This is Fedspeak for
[‘]We stepped in to avoid a financial chain reaction of unpredictable
magnitude.[’] In my opinion, the Fed was right to do so.”146
2!h !*90&()**0(906*0"". Of course, it was the very failure of Lehman,
and the cascading adverse and substantial impacts its bankruptcy has
caused, that led the Federal Reserve and the Treasury to alter course on the
day after Lehman’s failure, to prevent AIG’s bankruptcy and then to
recommend the TARP bailout.147 Those actions revealed to the world the
correlation between interconnectedness of unregulated OTC swaps
transactions and the too big to fail phenomenon.148
Again, the great portion of the taxpayer funds that went into the front
door of AIG to “save it” went out the back door as payments to its
derivatives counterparties.149 As the recent report of the Congressional
Oversight Panel (“COP”) on the AIG bailout makes clear, billions of the
taxpayer bailout went 100 cents on the dollar to AIG’s derivatives
counterparties.150 In this regard, COP observed as to AIG’s derivatives
book:
!* 9:0 )&67*.&, ()%&"0 )/ H%"7*0""S 9:0 ()"9" )/ 2!hb" 7*.H7579, 9)
+009 79" 60&7A.97A0 )H578.97)*" ;)%56 :.A0 H00* H)&*0 0*97&05, H,
2!hb" ":.&0:)560&" .*6 (&0679)&" J J J J =%9 &.9:0& 9:.* ":.&7*8
9:0 4.7* .+)*8 2!hb" (&0679)&"RSX J J J 9:0 8)A0&*+0*9 7*"90.6
":7/906 9:)"0 ()"9" 7* /%55 )*9) 9.Q4.,0&" J J J J F:0 &0"%59 ;." 9:.9
9:0 8)A0&*+0*9 H.(>06 %4 9:0 0*97&0 60&7A.97A0" +.&>09S ." 7/
9:0"0 9&.60" 60"0&A06 9:0 ".+0 9.Q4.,0& H.(>"9)4 ." ".A7*8"

146J !6J
147. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, JUNE OVERSIGHT REPORT: THE AIG RESCUE, ITS
IMPACT ON MARKETS, AND THE GOVERNMENT’S EXIT STRATEGY, 53 (June 10, 2010), .A.75.H50
.9 http://cop.senate.gov/documents/cop-061010-report.pdf (last visited on June 27, 2010).
148J -00 Jill E. Sommers, Remarks Before the Capital Markets Consortium: Clearinghouse as
Mitigators of Systematic Risk (Sept. 30, 2010), .A.75.H50 .9 http://www.cftc.gov/
PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/CommissionerJillESommers/opasommers-10 html (“One of the
lessons that emerged from the recent financial crisis was that institutions were not just “too big to
fail,” but also too interconnected through non-transparent swaps that the institutions did not
effectively manage.”).
149J -00 Alexander Sellinger, =.(>6))& =.75)%9 D7"(5)"%&0@ E%"9 9:0 G060&.5 <0"0&A0
D7"(5)"0 9:0 !60*97970" )/ 79" =)&&);0&" Z*60& 9:0 G&006)+ )/ !*/)&+.97)* 2(91, 15 FORDHAM J.
CORP. & FIN. L. 259, 260–261 (2009) (explaining the view that the billions used to bail out AIG
was really a back door bailout to other counterparties who continued to gamble with the funds);
Gretchen Morgenson, 29 2J!JhJS h))6 L%(> G)55);7*8 9:0 E)*0,, N.Y. TIMES, March 15, 2009,
at BU2 (revealing the counterparties that taxpayers bailed out with the funds allocated to A.I.G.
“include Goldman Sachs, Merrill Lynch and two French banks, Calyon and Societe Generale.”).
150. CONGRESSIONAL OVERSIGHT PANEL, "%4&. note Tc\S at 286.
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604)"79" .*6 (:0(>7*8 .(()%*9"J R'XA0&, ()%*90&4.&9, &0(07A06
0Q.(95, 9:0 ".+0 60.5@ . ()+45090 &0"(%0 .9 9.Q4.,0& 0Q40*"0J151
255 -;.4" 2&0 E.">06 =, $4.I%0 2(()%*97*8 3&7*(7450". A final
reason that all derivatives — not just credit derivatives —played a role in
the onset of the crisis is that they were never properly accounted for on
balance sheets.152 Because of a major lobbying effort by ISDA, for
example,
RHX.*>" .*6 ()&4)&.97)*" 9:.9 9&.60 ";.4" 6) *)9 45., H, 9:0
".+0 &%50" ." )9:0& 7*67A76%.5" .*6 H%"7*0""0"J =.*>" .&0
40&+79906 9) 0Q(5%60 9:07& /%55 0Q4)"%&0 9) ";.4" /&)+ 9:07&
/7*.*(7.5 "9.90+0*9"S .*6 7*"90.6 &04)&9 )*5, 9:0 i/.7& A.5%0b
(:.*80" 7* 9:)"0 ";.4" )A0& 97+0J -%(: &04)&97*8 7" 57>0 .*
7*67A76%.5 &04)&97*8 )*5, 9:0 (:.*80 7* 9:07& 60H9 H.5.*(0"S
7*"90.6 )/ 9:0 &04)&97*8 9:0 60H9" 9:0+"05A0"J153
Thus, prior to the meltdown, swaps of all kinds were masked by a
double barrier of opacityS 7J0JS not only were they private and bilateral, but
they were even hidden on the balance sheets of those institutions most
likely to suffer from their adverse impact.154 This kind of balance sheet
opacity blinded regulators and market observers from the explosive and
toxic nature of the contractual obligations embedded in swaps.155 And,
when the crisis became full blown in September 2008, this opacity led both
the extenders of credit and policy makers to fear the worst.156 As a result
bank lending froze up, causing the credit crisis.157

151J !6J at 9.
152. Frank Partnoy & Lynn E. Turner, =&7*8 F&.*"4.&0*(, 9) $//B=.5.*(0 -:009 2(()%*97*8,
7* ROOSEVELT INSTITUTE: MAKE MARKETS BE MARKETS 85, 88 (2010), .A.75.H50 .9
http://makemarketsbemarkets.org/report/MakeMarketsBeMarkets.pdf.
153J !6J
154J -00 76J at 86–88 (explaining how off-sheet balances of swaps were created by banks and
private businesses and were hidden from investors).
155J !6J at 87.
156J -00S 0J8JS Ben White & Vikas Bajaj, E)%*97*8 M)0" .9 C7978&)%4 =08.* ;79: =.*>b"
G.7506 =76 /)& M.(:)A7., N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2008, at B0 (explaining how the financial collapse
of Citigroup and defaults on major commercial loans “renewed fears that a vast wave of damaged
commercial loans would course through banks . . . already hit by a tsunami of toxic mortgage
products.”).
157J -00 Partnoy & Turner, "%4&. note 152,at 87.
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Dodd-Frank’s Solutions for Regulating Swaps

On July 21, 2010, President Barack Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (“Dodd-Frank
Act”)
into
law.158 The Dodd-Frank Act transforms the regulation of OTC derivatives
by generally requiring that swaps be subject to clearing and exchange-like
trading, including capital and margin requirements.159
The Act first requires that all “swap dealers” and “major swap
participants” register with the appropriate banking regulators, the CFTC,
and/or the SEC.160 A swap dealer is an entity that (1) holds itself out as
such, (2) makes a market in swaps, (3) regularly enters into swaps for its
own account in the ordinary course of business, or (4) engages in activity
generally recognized in the trade as dealing in swaps.161 Major swap
participants are entities that are not swap dealers and (1) maintain a
substantial position in swaps, excluding transactions used to hedge
commercial risk, (2) create substantial counterparty exposure that could
undermine the banking system or financial markets, or (3) are highly
leveraged, not subject to capital requirements, and maintain a substantial
position in swaps.162
Registered swap dealers and major swap participants must disclose
any material risks of swaps and any material incentives or conflicts of
interests.163 In addition, they must meet capital and margin requirements
and conform to business conduct rules, including those related to fraud and
market manipulation, that are set by the regulators (while clearing
organizations and exchanges can supplement these requirements).164 They
must also conform to position limits on their trading volume in commodity

158. Brady Dennis, $H.+. Z":0&" 7* O0; G7*.*(7.5 '&.l L.*6+.&> L.; 7" -78*06 3&0"760*9
-.," M)&> -9755 L70" 2:0.6 /)& <08%5.9)&", WASH. POST, July 22, 2010, at A13.
159. BAIRD WEBEL ET AL., CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R40975, FINANCIAL REGULATORY
REFORM AND THE 111TH CONGRESS, 12 (2010) .A.75.H50 .9 http://assets.opencrs.
com/rpts/R40975_20100601.pdf (“H.R. 4173 . . . mandate reporting, centralized clearing, and
exchange-trading of OTC derivatives . . . . The bill[] require[s] regulators to impose capital
requirements on swap dealers and “major swap participants.”).
160. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 731(a) (2010).
161J !6J § 721(a).
162J !6J
163J !6J §§ 731(h)(3)(B), 764(g)(3)(B)(i) –(ii).
164J !6J §§ 731(e), 764(e)–(h).
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swaps, which are to be set by standards established by the regulators.165
The Dodd-Frank Act also requires that swaps transactions be reported.166
The Dodd-Frank Act imposes the clearing and exchange-like trading
requirements on standardized swap transactions.167
Both types of
regulation are central features of the CEA’s regulation of futures.168 Under
a clearing system, a clearing facility stands between the buyer and seller of
a contract to guarantee each against failure of the other party.169 To avoid
their own liability, clearing facilities have a strong incentive to establish
and enforce the capital adequacy of traders, including the collection of
margin, i.e., deposits on the amount at risk in a trade.170 Under the DoddFrank Act, the regulatory agencies decide whether specific types of swaps
must be cleared, and designated clearing organizations (“DCOs”) must
inform regulators about which types of swaps they plan to clear.171 DCOs
must allow “non-discriminatory” access to clearing.172 Swaps that are
required to be cleared must also be traded on a designated contract market,
securities exchange or swap execution facility (“SEF”).173 Swaps do not
have to be cleared or exchange traded if no existing entity lists a particular
swap product.174
The Dodd-Frank Act contains a narrow “end-user” exception designed
to ease the burden on businesses using swaps to mitigate risk associated
with their commercial activities.175 For example, airlines buying fuel may

165J !6J §§ 737, 763(h).
166J !6J § 727(c).
167J -00 Ownership Limitations and Governance Requirements for Security-Based Swap
Clearing Agencies, Security-Based Swap Execution Facilities, and National Securities Exchanges
with Respect to Security-Based Swaps Under Regulation MC, 75 Fed. Reg. 65,882 (Oct. 26,
2010) (explaining some of the regulations the Dodd-Frank Act imposes on swap transactions).
168. Greenberger, "%4&. note 133, at 99.
169J !6J
170J !6J
171. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 723(h)(2)(A), 763(a)(1)(2010).
172J !6J § 763(a)(2)(B).
173J !6J §§ 723(e), 763(a)(2)(B).
174J !6J § 763.
175J -00 Letter from Christopher Dodd, Chairman, Senate Committee on Banking, Housing,
and Urban Affairs, & Blanche Lincoln, Chairman, Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition,
and Forestry, to Barney Frank, The Honorable Chairman, Financial Services Committee, & Colin
Peterson, The Honorable Chairman, Committee on Agriculture, (June 30, 2010), .A.75.H50 .9
http://www.wilmerhale.com/files/upload/June%2030%202010%20Dodd_Lincoln_Letter.pdf
(explaining the end-user exception is “for those entities that are using the swaps market to hedge
or mitigate commercial risk.”).
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use uncleared swaps to hedge against price increases. The exception
applies to parties that are not financial entities, are using swaps to hedge or
mitigate commercial risk, and have notified the CFTC and/or SEC how they
meet financial obligations of non-cleared swaps.176 It does not cover swaps
in which both parties are major swap participants, swap dealers or other
financial entities.177
Despite the end-user exception, the Dodd-Frank Act imposes its
reporting requirements for all swaps, whether or not they are cleared.178
The swaps must be reported to a registered swap data repository, the CFTC
or the SEC and reporting must occur as soon as technologically possible
after execution.179 Margin requirements technically apply to all swaps,
although the Act’s sponsors have stated that they are not intended to apply
to end-users.180
One of the more controversial provisions in the Dodd-Frank Act is the
Lincoln or “Push-Out” Rule, which prohibits federal assistance to any bank
operating as a swap dealer in most commodity-type derivatives
transactions.181 Federal assistance is defined broadly to include, 7*90& .57.,
federal deposit insurance or access to the Federal Reserve’s discount
window.182 Although the Push-Out Rule does not take effect for two years,
its logical consequence may be to encourage banks to “push out” or divest
their commodity-based swap divisions, so that they can maintain access to
federal banking resources.183
Similarly, the Volcker Rule generally prohibits banks from engaging
in proprietary trading (that is, trading that is on its own behalf and not a
176. Dodd -Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 723(h)(7), 763(g)(2010).
177J !6J
178J !6J §§ 727, 731, 764.
179J !6J §§ 727, 729, 763, 764.
180J !6J §§ 731, 764; -00 Clearly Gottlieb, D)66BG&.*> M.55 -9&009 <0/)&+ .*6 C)*"%+0&
3&)90(97)* 2(9 3)7"06 9) Z":0& 7* -;0047*8 <0/)&+ )/ ZJ-J G7*.*(7.5 -0&A7(0" <08%5.97)*, July 9,
2010, at 25, .A.75.H50 .9 http://www.cgsh.com/files/News/8a4361fa-131b-46b9-a3ad779430dac8a6/Presentation/NewsAttachment/153327b9-3da0-4d63-b2cb32c8022d8159/Cleary%20Gottlieb%20Dodd-Frank%20Alert%20Memo.pdf
(“Recent correspondence between Senators Dodd and Lincoln, states that the margin
requirements are not intended to be interpreted to require end user counterparties to post margin to
a swap dealer or major swap participant. [R]egulators and commentators will need to consider
what weight, if any, to give to this legislative history.”).
181. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 716 (2010).
182J !6J
183J !6J
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customer’s) or acquiring or retaining an interest in a hedge fund or private
equity fund.184 While the Volcker Rule will not be implemented
immediately,185 the consequence almost certainly is that many of these
activities will also move from banks to other smaller and less systemically
risky entities.186
Dodd-Frank also creates a resolution authority, which allows
complicated questions of the orderly unwinding of a too-big-to-fail
institution to be handled administratively rather than in a bankruptcy
proceeding.187 However, as one noted economist has recently made clear,
the unwinding of the obligations of OTC counterparties may, in the absence
of effective implementation of the Dodd-Frank OTC derivative reforms, be
far too complex whether it is done by banking regulators or by a court.188
Johnson has concluded:
RMX:0* . R9)) H78 9) /.75 7*"979%97)*X 7" 7* 9&)%H50 N.*6 9:0&0 .&0
"%H"9.*97.5 :)567*8" )/ ()+450Q .*6 )4.I%0 60&7A.97A0" )* 9:0
H.5.*(0 ":009" )/ .55 R"%(:X /7&+" N &0")5%97)* .%9:)&7970" :.A0
67//7(%59, %*&.A057*8 ;0H )/ 0Q4)"%&0" .*6 A.5%7*8 9:0+
4&)40&5,J J J JZ*/)&9%*.905,S 79 7" 0.", 9) %*60&"9.*6 ;:,
&0")5%97)* .%9:)&7970" ()%56 H0 7*6%(06 9) /)&0H0.& &.9:0& 9:.*
&0")5A0 .* R9)) H78 9) /.75 7*"979%97)*X ;:0* 9:0, :.A0 *) (5.&79,
.H)%9 79" "9&%(9%&0 .*6 4.990&*" )/ 0Q4)"%&0"J !* "%(: .
(7&(%+"9.*(0S 79 +., H0 0."70& 9) 7*(%& 9:0 &7"> 9:.9 9:0 7*")5A0*9
R/7&+b"X H.5.*(0 ":009 ":)%56 ()*97*%0 9) 6090&7)&.90J J J J189
How Will We Know If the Dodd-Frank Act Is Working?

Dodd-Frank has been hailed as an important and comprehensive financial
reform.190 But like many reforms before it, proof of its success lies not in
184J !6. § 619.
185J !6J The Financial Stability Oversight Council will first conduct a six-month study, after
which regulators will have nine months to write regulations; the provisions will take effect the
earlier of 12 months after the agencies issue regulations or two years after enactment of DoddFrank, but banks will have a two-year transition period that can be extended up to three years. !6J
186. Greenberger, "%4&. note 107, at 38.
187. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 201–217 (2010).
188J -00 Johnson, "%4&. note 111, at 123.
189J !6.
190J -00S 0J8J, Dennis, "%4&. note 158 (“President Obama launched a new era in the
relationship between Washington and the financial world when he placed his signature
Wednesday on a massive bill to rewrite the nation's financial rules.”).
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the text of the law, but in how it is administratively implemented. In five
years, for example: How will we know if the Act has successfully changed
the landscape of the U.S. financial system? How will we know if taxpayers
and consumers are better protected against another economic meltdown? If
effectively implemented, OTC markets should have:
TJ O7*09, 40& (0*9 )/ "9.*6.&67K06 $FC 60&7A.97A0" H07*8 (50.&06 .*6
0Q(:.*80 9&.606S ;79: Y%"9 T^d 0Q0+49 H."06 )* 9:0 0*6B%"0&
0Q(5%"7)*J
The basic rule of the Dodd-Frank Act is that swaps must be cleared
and exchange traded. One of the few exceptions is for commercial end
users.191 As CFTC Chairman Gary Gensler has said, the “exception should
be narrowly defined to include only nonfinancial entities that use swaps as
an 7*(760*9.5 4.&9 )/ 9:07& H%"7*0"" to hedge actual commercial risks. Even
though individual transactions with a financial counterparty may seem
insignificant, in aggregate, they can affect the health of the entire
system.”192
To achieve this end, regulators must carefully consider how they
define hedging for commercial risk. A model for doing so may come from
proposed CFTC position limit regulations promulgated in January 2010,
which would have imposed potential speculative position limits on futures
contracts for certain energy commodities.193 Suggesting an exemption for
bona fide hedging, the CFTC relied on a definition from regulation 1.3(z),
under which bona fide hedging includes “transactions or positions [that]
normally represent a substitute for transactions to be made or positions to
be taken at a later time 7* . 4:,"7(.5 +.&>097*8 (:.**05, and where they are
economically appropriate to the reduction of risks in the conduct and

191J -00 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 723(a)(7) (2010) (providing an exception to the clearing requirement for some non-financial
entities.).
192. Gary Gensler, Chair of the CFTC, Remarks at Exchequer Club of Washington, (Nov. 18,
2009),
.A.75.H50
.9
http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/ChairmanGaryGensler/opagensler-20 html
(emphasis added).
193J -00 Federal Speculative Position Limits for Referenced Energy Contracts and Associated
Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 4144 (proposed Jan. 26, 2010) (withdrawn 75 Fed. Reg. 50950 (Aug.
18, 2010)). The January 2010 proposal was withdrawn to accommodate a broader position limit
proposal reflecting the expanded authority provided by the Dodd-Frank Act, but the substance as
it relates to the text above is virtually identical. -00 Position Limits for Derivatives, 76 Fed. Reg.
4752, 4756 (proposed Jan. 26, 2011).
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management of a ()++0&(7.5 0*90&4&7"0.”194
Further, the CFTC
emphasized that “[u]nder the proposed regulations, traders holding
positions pursuant to a H)*. /760 hedge exemption would generally be
prohibited from also trading speculatively. This definition limits the enduser exemption to those whose intent is, ultimately, to purchase or sell a
physical commodity, rather than a bank.”195 Such an approach would be
sufficiently narrow to limit the ability of entities to circumvent regulation.
_J -;.4 60.50&" )& +.Y)& ";.4 4.&97(74.*9" ;755 :.A0 *) +)&0 9:.*
_^d );*0&":74 )/ .*, 60&7A.97A0 (50.&7*8 )&8.*7K.97)* `PDC$naS
H).&6 )/ 9&.60 `P=$FnaS )& ";.4 0Q0(%97)* /.(7579, `P-'GnaJ
One of the main principals shaping derivatives regulation under the
Dodd-Frank Act is to provide free and open access to clearing and exchange
trading by financial institutions.196 Simply put, clearing and exchange
trading are designed to reduce risk by providing price transparency,
requiring that investors set aside adequate capital in case of default, and
producing public information on who is involved in trading and to what
extent.197 But if large numbers of trading institutions are excluded from
clearing organizations or exchanges, the protections otherwise contributed
by these requirements will be undermined.198
Already, large swap dealers and banks are working to limit access and
competition from smaller entities by creating ways to exert control over
DCOs, BOTs, and SEFs.199 According to the Office of the Comptroller of
the Currency, just five U.S. banks represent 98% of the total amount

194. -00 76JS at n.49 (citing 17 CFR 1.3(z)(1)).
195J -00 Federal Speculative Position Limits for Referenced Energy Contracts and Associated
Regulations, 75 Fed. Reg. 4144, 4159 (Jan. 26 2010).
196J -00, 0J8J, S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 32–35 (2010) (noting that draft provisions concerning
OTC derivatives were designed to minimize non-cleared, off-exchange trades); CFTC & SEC,
PUBLIC ROUNDTABLE ON GOVERNANCE AND CONFLICTS OF INTEREST IN THE CLEARING AND
LISTING
OF
SWAPS
33
(Aug.
20,
2010),
.A.75.H50
.9
http://www.cftc.gov/ucm/groups/public/@swaps/documents/dfsubmission/dfsubmission9_082010
.pdf (statement of Randy Kroszner, University of Chicago, Booth School of Business) (“And the
law is clear: Open access is the fundamental principle.”) [hereinafter CFTC/SEC Roundtable].
197. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 29–35 (2010) (“The combination of these new regulatory tools
will provide market participants and investors with more confidence during times of crisis,
taxpayers with protection against the need to pay for mistakes made by companies, derivatives
users with more price transparency and liquidity, and regulators with more information about the
risks in the system.”).
198. Greenberger, "%4&. note 107, at 39.
199J !6.
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invested by banks in swaps.200 In many cases, clearinghouses and
exchanges are owned by banks, including those that are the five dominant
swaps investors.201 In an apparent attempt to discourage competition, the
banks, in their roles as clearinghouse owners, have imposed unnecessarily
high capital requirements or other thresholds, far in excess of that needed
for conservative risk management, as minimums for satisfying the
clearinghouse membership eligibility, in order to keep smaller, but highly
credit worthy institutions out of the clearing process.202
While several proposals have been advanced, a simple solution to this
problem is to curtail the influence and control of large banks over clearing
and exchange institutions by capping their ownership at a maximum of
20%. Indeed, the CFTC proposed a rule that included imposing the 20%
ownership limitations on October 1, 2010.203 The 20% ownership
restriction is similar to an amendment proposed in 2009 by Representative
Stephen Lynch and included in the House version of the Dodd-Frank bill.
This amendment would have restricted the beneficial ownership interest to
an aggregate of 20% of all swap dealers and major swap participants, as
well as those associated with them.204 Although the Lynch amendment was
stripped from Dodd-Frank by the Conference Committee before final
passage, the Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFTC and SEC to adopt rules
eliminating conflicts of interest arising from the control of clearing and
exchange institutions where a swap dealer or major swap participant has “a
material debt or material equity investment.”205 In carrying out the duties
200. COMPTROLLER OF THE CURRENCY, OCC’S QUARTERLY REPORT ON BANK TRADING
DERIVATIVES ACTIVITIES, FIRST QUARTER 2010, at Graph 4, .A.75.H50 .9
http://www.occ.treas.gov/ftp/release/2010-71a.pdf [hereinafter OCC Report] (finding swaps
transactions that involved banks outside the top five were just $3,186 out of a total of $136,330).
201J 'J8J, CFTC/SEC Roundtable, "%4&. note 196, at 112 (statement of Michael Greenberger)
(stating that one exchange’s ownership structure includes nine banks taking 50% of profits).
202J -00 76J at 25–26, 39 (statements of Jason Kastner, Vice Chairman, Swaps and Derivatives
Market Association) (stating that banks have been “really clever about keeping people out of the
system” and providing example that one clearinghouse has set high capital requirements and large
amounts of previously cleared swaps for institutions to join).
203. Matthew Leising, CGFC 3&)4)"0" C.447*8 =.*> -9.>0" 7* C50.&7*8:)%"0",
BLOOMBERG.COM, Oct. 1, 2010, .A.75.H50 .9 http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-10-01/cftcproposes-20-bank-ownership-caps-on-swaps-clearinghouses htmlJ
204J -00 H.R. REP. NO. 111-370, pt. 5, at 188 (2009).
205. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 726, 765; -00 .5") (CONG. REC. 5217(June 30, 2010)) (in a colloquy with Rep. Lynch, House
Financial Services Chair Barney Frank agreeing that Sections 726 and 765 of the Dodd-Frank Act
require the SEC and CFTC to adopt rules eliminating the conflicts of interest arising from the
control of clearing and trading facilities by entities such as swap dealers, security-based swap
dealers, and major swap and security-based swap participants).
AND
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expressly delegated by the Act, the CFTC and SEC have complete and
unfettered discretion to create restrictions on ownership—including
numerical caps.206 These restrictions would be effective and clear tools for
ensuring that large banks would not employ highly anti-competitive policies
over clearing and exchange institutions in a manner that would exclude
smaller participants.
Some observers have argued that requiring an independent board of
governors—that is, one that is not comprised of banks, but outside experts
or other members—would effectively avoid the problem of overly
concentrated power.207 However, a recent example shows the futility of
relying on that approach alone: In 2009, ICE Trust acquired the Clearing
Corp., creating a clearinghouse essentially owned by nine of the largest
swap trading banks.208 Although ICE Trust claims to be managed by an
independent board, the acquisition involved a profit-sharing scheme in
which these banks not only have an ownership in ICE Trust, but, in
addition, will receive collectively in their own names 50% of the profits.
The founding banks will be subject to a pricing structure distinct from that
applied to other banks.209 In order to mitigate the potential conflicts of
206. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203, §§
726, 265. -00S 0J8JS Matthew Leising, CGFC E., L7+79 =.*>" 9) _^d -9.>0" /)& C50.&7*8:)%"0",
BLOOMBERG.COM, Sept. 30, 2010, .A.75.H50 .9 http://www.bloomberg.com/new/2010-09-29/cftcsaid-to-propose-20-bank-ownership-of-swaps-clearinghouses html (“The Commodity Futures
Trading Commission is considering limiting banks and investors to owning no more than 20
percent of swaps clearinghouses, exchanges and trading systems.”); "00 .5") Jonathan Spicer &
Roberta Rampton, CGFC ',0" $;*0&":74 C.4" /)& -;.4" !*/&."9&%(9%&0, REUTERS, Sept. 29.
2010, available at http://www reuters.com/article/idUSN2911906520100930; "00 .5") CFTC/SEC
Roundtable, "%4&. note 196, at 112 (stating that the conflict of interest “provision is
extraordinarily broad”); "00 .5") Comment Letter by Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney
General, Antitrust Division, U.S. Department of Justice, to David Stawick, Secretary, Commodity
Futures Trading Commission, Requirements for Derivatives Clearing Organizations, Designated
Contract Markets, and Swap Execution Facilities Regarding the Mitigation of Conflicts of Interest
(December 28, 2010), .A.75.H50 .9 http://comments.cftc.gov/PublicComments/ViewComment.
aspx?id=26809&SearchText= (DOJ Antitrust Division strongly advises the CFTC to adopt a strict
aggregate limit on ownership by swap dealers and major swap participants for DCOs, DCMs and
SEFs).
207J -00S 0J8J, 76J at 120–21 (statement of Lynn Martin, NYSE Life) (stating that board
independence is a more effective way to handle conflicts of interest than mandating ownership
restrictions, because it ensures broad representation of constituency interests).
208. INTERCONTINENTALEXCHANGE, ANNUAL REPORT 2 (2009), .A.75.H50 .9 http
://materials.proxyvote.com/Approved/45865V/20100323/AR_56919/images/IntercontinentalExch
ange-AR2009.pdf.
209J !C' F&%"9 9) =087* 3&)(0""7*8 .*6 C50.&7*8 C&0679 D0/.%59 -;.4" E.&(: U, The Clearing
Corp., Mar. 6, 2009, .A.75.H50 .9 http://www.clearingcorp.com/press/pressreleases/20090306-iceprocess-cds html.
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interest in the operation of a DCO, DCM, and SEF, the CFTC and the SEC
separately proposed rules to mandate more outside directors to serve on the
board of DCO, DCM and SEF.210 However, when confronting the kind of
massive concentration of market power through the ownership of the
strongest swaps dealers as is presently the case with ICE Trust, even the
most demanding requirements for the inclusion of independent board
directors, in and of themselves, can by no means realistically insure DoddFrank's "free and open access" mandate. There must be strict aggregate
ownership limits to complement strong independent director requirements.
VJ 255 5.&80 /7*.*(7.5 7*"979%97)*" 9:.9 60.5 7* )& H%, ";.4" ;)%56 H0
"%HY0(9 9) "9&7(9 (.479.5 &0I%7&0+0*9" .*6 &78)&)%" H%"7*0"" ()*6%(9
&%50"J
As noted above, swap dealers and major swap participants must
conform to capital requirements and business conduct rules set by the
regulators. As they define the term “swap dealers” regulators should aim to
capture the top 200 or so entities dealing in derivatives.211 As Chairman
Gensler recently stated, “initial estimates are that there could be in excess of
200 entities that will seek to register as swap dealers [under the Dodd-Frank
Act],” including “[209] global and regional banks currently known to offer
swaps” as “Primary Members” of the International Swaps and Derivatives
Association (“ISDA”).212 These entities should be encompassed by the
definitions adopted by the CFTC.
To achieve this number, agencies should consider how they define
several terms. First, the CFTC and SEC should adopt a definition used by
ISDA for deciding which institutions should be registered. The ISDA
definition includes all business organizations and entities that deal in
derivatives except those who do so “solely for the purposes of risk hedging
or asset or liability management.”213 In adopting this definition, the
regulators should also clarify that it does not exclude entities that claim to
use derivatives for risk hedging or asset or liability management, but for

210. Rachelle Younglai & Roberta Rampton, G2CF=$oBD7//0&0*(0" 7* -'CS CGFC
C50.&7*8:)%"0 3&)4)".5", REUTERS, Oct. 13, 2010, .A.75.H50 .9 http://www reuters.com/article/
idUSN1318594320101013.
211. Greenberger, "%4&. note 107, .9 40.
212. Statement of Chairman Gary Gensler, ISDA Regional Conference (Sept. 16, 2010),
.A.75.H50 .9 http://www.cftc.gov/PressRoom/SpeechesTestimony/opagensler-50 html.
213J -00 Official Website of International Swaps and Derivatives Association, Inc., P3&7+.&,
E0+H0&":74Sn .A.75.H50 .9 http://www.isda.org.

160

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

M G

whom the transactions could materially affect their financial condition
based on the significant revenue generated by the swaps.
Another key issue will be how to determine whether a firm enters into
swaps in the course of “regular business,” because swap dealers do not
include persons who enter into swaps for their own account, as long as they
do not do so as part of their regular business.214 To ensure that regulation
will cover the largest dealers, regulators should define regular business
based on an institution’s annual average trading revenue from all swaps
activities, as a percentage of total trading revenue. This percentage provides
insight as to the nature of an institution’s business, and agencies should use
it to compare the relative positions of various institutions as well as the
importance of swaps to a particular firm.215
Because trading revenue from swaps activities is currently unavailable
to the public or regulators,216 in order to allow regulators to assess this
percentage, the regulators should require all entities that have annual
trading revenue over one billion dollars to provide the appropriate regulator
with audited financial statements reporting gross and net trading revenue
from all swap activities. The percentage triggering regulation should be two
percent, and the percentage should be adjusted accordingly based on the
reported data going forward.
The term “major swap participant” encompasses three broad
categories: entities that maintain a substantial position in “major swaps
categories,” those that pose substantial risk to counterparties, and those that
are highly leveraged.217
Here, “major swaps categories” should be broken down to reflect
relatively specific commodity products, so that entities that are heavily
involved in a commodity—and thus can influence prices—do not escape
regulation by “hiding” within a larger category. For example, the
categories should be defined not just as “energy” or even “crude oil,” but
should be broken down to a precise commodity product, 7J0J, “light sweet
crude oil.” In addition, “substantial position” should be measured by the
notional value of an entity’s swap positions, as a proportion of the notional
value of all swaps positions held by all entities. This can paint a picture of

214J -00 Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§ 721(a)(21) (2010).
215. Greenberger, "%4&. note 107, at 40.
216J !6.
217J !6J
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how concentrated risk is, and regulators can use it to ensure that the firms
with the most risk are covered by regulation.
Entities creating substantial counterparty exposure can be determined
by looking at two factors: (1) how much is currently at risk in case of
default, measured by the market value of contracts, and (2) how much could
potentially be at risk in the future, over the life of the contract.218 To assess
both, agencies should consider how many counterparties are at risk through
swaps transactions with a given entity—a measure of interconnectedness, or
the extent to which an institution’s failure would have a ripple effect into
the overall economy. In addition, agencies should consider the financial
stability of counterparties, to capture transactions that involve one or very
few counterparties but may still create substantial risk.
Highly leveraged entities can be identified based on the entities’
current credit risk relative to their capital.219 Where agencies find that
entities have taken on too much risk, they should restrict them from
additional swaps activities and/or require an increase in available capital.
This will prevent an excessively leveraged firm from triggering significant
market dysfunction.220
cJ 3&)4&709.&, .*6 ()++)679, 9&.67*8S :0680 .*6 0I%79, /%*6"S .*6
%*(50.&06 (&0679 60/.%59 ";.4" ;755 H0 80*0&.55, +)A06 /&)+ 5.&80
H.*>" 9) "+.550& "9&%(9%&0" ;79: /0;0& 4)90*97.5 .6A0&"0 7+4.(9" )*
9:0 )A0&.55 /7*.*(7.5 ","90+J
As noted earlier, the Dodd-Frank Act includes both the “Volker Rule,”
which generally prohibits banks from engaging in proprietary trading or
ownership of hedge or equity funds, and the “Lincoln” or “Push-Out Rule,”
which requires bank holding companies to establish separate affiliated
corporations for, 7*90& .57., commodity swaps dealings and unregulated
CDSs in order to benefit from federal assistance.221 Although both

218J -00 PRESIDENT’S WORKING GROUP ON FINANCIAL MARKETS, HEDGE FUNDS,
LEVERAGE, AND THE LESSONS OF LONG-TERM CAPITAL MANAGEMENT 9 (April 1999), .A.75.H50
.9 http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/reports/hedgfund.pdf.
219J -00 OCC Report, supra note 200, at 4 (“Net current credit exposure is the primary metric
used by the OCC to evaluate credit risk in bank derivatives activities.”).
220J -00 80*0&.55, DEP’T OF TREASURY, FINANCIAL REGULATORY REFORM, A NEW
FOUNDATION: REBUILDING FINANCIAL SUPERVISION AND REGULATION (2009).
221. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§ 619 and 716 (2010).

162

JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW

M G

provisions have long lead times before implementation, they are already
having their intended effects.222
In anticipation of the Volcker Rule, for example, a private equity
division at Bank of America left in the fall of 2010 to form a new hedge
fund.223 Even before the final bill was passed, Citigroup sold a private
equity fund, and it is considering moving at least one of its proprietary
trading units into a separate hedge fund.224 At Goldman Sachs, proprietary
traders are reportedly leaving to join new or existing hedge funds.225 JP
Morgan recently announced it will shut down its proprietary trading in
commodities as a first step in closing down all proprietary trading.226 All
of these firms, and traders within them, have stated that they are taking
action for to resolve regulatory uncertainty, so that they are not
“. . .worrying about what they’re going to be doing a couple of years from
now. . . .”227
This movement is healthy—a sign that the Volcker and Lincoln Rules
will have a powerful impact. The transactions covered by the Rule will
move from banks that are too-big-to-fail to more diverse and less
systemically risky parts of the market, for example, hedge funds. As the
Senate Committee on Banking suggested, the Volcker Rule “. . .will reduce
the scale, complexity, and interconnectedness of those banks that are now
actively engaged in proprietary trading, or have hedge fund or private
equity exposure. [It] will reduce the possibility that banks will be too big or
too complex to resolve in an orderly manner should they fail.”228 In
addition, investment banks will not be able to create risky financial

222. Randall Smith et. al., F:0 O0; <%50" )/ G7*.*(0@ !+4.(9 9) <0.(: =0,)*6 M.55 -9&009 N
m0, p%0"97)*" Z*&0")5A06 /)& =%"7*0""0" .*6 C)*"%+0&" Z*975 =755 h)0" !*9) '//0(9, WALL ST.
J., July 16, 2010, at A4.
223. Martin Arnold & Francesco Guerrera, =%,B)%9 -47*B)// E)A0 H, = )/ 2, FIN. TIMES
(London), Aug. 4, 2010, at Companies – International 19.
224J !6J; "00 .5") Dawn Kopecki & Chanyaporn Chanjaroen, f3E)&8.* -.76 9) '*6
3&)4&709.&, F&.67*8 9) E009 q)5(>0& <%50, BLOOMBERG NEWS (Aug. 31, 2010), .A.75.H50 .9
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-08-31/jpmorgan-is-said-to-shut-proprietary-trading-tocomply-with-volcker-rule html.
225. Christine Harper & Saijel Kishan, h)56+.* -.(:" -.76 9) -:%9 3&7*(74.5 -9&.90870" Z*79,
BLOOMBERG NEWS (Sep. 4, 2010), http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2010-09-03/goldman-saidto-shut-principal-strategies-unit-to-comply-with-volcker-rule html.
226. Kopecki & Chanjaroen, "%4&. note 224.
227. Harper & Kishan, "%4&. note 225.
228. S. REP. NO. 111-176, at 7 (2010).
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products and sell them to investors, while holding on to the other side of the
bets to make profits at customers’ expense.229
The Lincoln or Push-Out Rule is also already driving risky trades into
more diverse structures.230 JP Morgan, for example, is spinning off its
high-risk commodity derivatives into a unit that will be separate from its
other investments.231 This movement is healthy, because speculation in
commodity swaps has almost certainly contributed significantly to price
volatility in commodities and commodity index funds, an effect that has
increased with the influx of more speculation, including “. . .the rapid
growth of index investment. . . [,]” in commodity futures markets.232 To
the extent that smaller and more diverse entities engage in such speculation,
they will have a lessened impact on commodity index fund prices, simply
because they have less influence in these markets.233 Moreover, where
commodity index funds do have swaps subject to Dodd-Frank, they will be
regulated.234
]J '*0&8, .*6 /))6 4&7(0" ;755 H0 0Q45.7*06 H, +.&>09 /%*6.+0*9.5"
&.9:0& 9:.* /.(9)&" 9:.9 +., H0 .99&7H%9.H50 9) 0Q(0""7A0
"40(%5.97)*J
The Dodd-Frank Act requires the CFTC to set position limits on the
amount of swaps trading that entities can conduct, with the goal of limiting
speculation and subsequent volatility in commodities.235 Speculation can
unmoor prices from market fundamentals such as supply and demand.236 In
essence, prices are usually determined by a healthy tension between
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commercial users, who want low prices, and producers, who want high
ones. Speculators, however, are unconcerned about what a fair price for a
commodity might be, but rather they want prices to move dramatically in
the direction of their bets.237 Position limits will minimize the role of
speculation by limiting both its volume and impact, allowing market
fundamentals to be the primary driver of prices.238
The impact of speculation on oil pricing was evident between 2007
and 2009, when prices rose from $65 per barrel in June 2007, to $145 in
July 2008, to the $30s in winter 2008-09, shifting to the $60s and $70s in
2009.239 More recently, oil has been threatening to back to record high
levels reached in mid-2008.240
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As noted above, the Dodd-Frank Act affords the CFTC and SEC the
authority to require that uncleared swaps adhere to “real-time reporting.” In
particular, those swaps that are not accepted for clearing at a derivatives
clearing organization must be reported to a registered swap data repository
or, if no swap data repository will accept the report, to regulators in a
manner that does not disclose the business transactions and market
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positions of any person.241 The Act defines “real-time reporting” as public
dissemination of data relating to a transaction, including price and volume,
as soon as technologically practicable after the time at which the swap
transaction has been executed.242
Also, the Act authorizes the CFTC and SEC to make swap transaction
and pricing data available to the public in such forms and at such times as
are deemed appropriate to enhance price discovery.243 In light of this,
Chairman Gensler has recently stated that
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Under these reporting requirements, regulators will receive all relevant
and necessary data in a timely manner.245 As such, the reporting
requirements are significant because they are one of the only ways that
regulators and other observers can assess whether derivatives are significant
enough to pose risk to the market through their size or the
interconnectedness of counterparties.246 Indeed, the lack of reporting and
transparency was a main cause of regulators’ inability to anticipate the
effect of undercapitalized swaps on the financial markets in 2007 and
2008.247
Conclusion

Untouched by the traditional norms of market regulation, the unsupervised
multi-trillion dollar swaps market helped create a highly speculative
derivative bubble that was opaque to federal regulators and market
observers alike.248 Thus, the swaps market permitted trillions of dollars of
241. Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, Pub. L. No. 111-203,
§§727, 729, 763, 764 (2010).
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financial commitments to be made with no assurance that those
commitments could be fulfilled—beyond the false comfort of the highly
illusory and wholly inappropriate AAA-ratings of the counterparties in
question and/or the instruments to be insured.249
In contrast, had the norms of market regulation been applicable to
OTC derivatives, swaps transactions would have been adequately
capitalized by traditional clearing practices, and the dangers building up in
swaps markets would otherwise have been observable by regulators,
investors, academics and market observers thanks to the transparency and
price discipline that accompanies exchange trading.250 These protections
would have been applicable not only to the CDS market, but to other
derivatives transactions that contributed to the crisis, including interest rate,
currency, foreign-exchange and energy swaps.251
Dodd-Frank’s mandate for capital adequacy and transparency in
derivatives markets is Congress’ answer to the financial crisis, and the
contours of the Act hold great promise for helping to avoid a similar crisis
in the future. The true test of the Dodd-Frank Act, however, is simple but
profound: Has it made the economy any safer from the threat of another
economic meltdown? The Act has the potential to effectively regulate the
derivatives markets, if regulators make the most of the tools made available
to them by Dodd-Frank.252
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